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As a border state, Kentucky occupied a unique position in the early days of the Civil War.

Her neutral

stance was observed by the belligerents for the first
five months of the conflict, but in September 1861,
troops entered the state.

Confederate armies under the

leadership of Brigadier Generals Humphrey Marshall and
Felix Zollicoffer sought to drive the Federal forces from
eastern Kentucky.

Through a series of skirmishes, how-

ever, the Southern armies were repelled and placed on the
defensive.

Later defeats at Logan's Cross Roads and

Middle Creek in early January 1862
tucky of Confederate forces.

cleared eastern Ken-

For the next several months,

the Confederates regrouped out of the state and planned
a major offensive to deliver Kentucky to the Confederacy.
Under the guidance of Generals Braxton Bragg and E. Kirby
Smith, the fateful invasion took shape in August 1862.
But by then, possibly the best chance for a Confederate
Kentucky had already passed.

vi

I.

KENTUCKY:

CONFEDERATE OR UNION

The roots of civil conflict extend deep into United
States history.

Evidence of discord surfaced as early as

1787 when ratification of the Constitution was contingent
upon further clarification of individual and state rights.
Many Americans feared a strong Federal government and held
firm in their belief of state rights, which as a theory
was issued in 1798 by the Kentucky legislature.

Known as

the Kentucky Resolutions, they theorized that the Federal
govcz-iment had only certain rcstticted powers which were
legated to it by the Constitution, a compact among the
various states composing the Union.

Political sovereignty,

therefore, resided exclusively with the state which had the
right to judge the constitutionality of an issue, and even
nullify Federal legislation.

During the nineteenth century

Southern leaders such as John C. Calhoun championed state
rights and carried the concept one step further to s ,c,
?s—on,
a tool which a state could use as its ultimate defense
against an oppressive Federal government.

With this politi-

cal premise, the South during the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s
became increasingly conservative in domestic affairs, defensive of individual freedoms, including slavery, and steadfast
in devotion to a political theorum:

1

state rights.

2
The collapse of old political parties during the midnineteenth century severed bonds between the North and South.
The newly formed Republican party catered strictly to the
North, while the once solid Democratic party split in 1860,
assuring Abraham Lincoln of the presidency.

Lincoln, however,

polled only 1,064 votes in his native Kentucky, with Constitutional Union party candidate John bell receiving 66,051
votes to 53,143 for National Democratic party candidate John
C. Breckinridge, and 25,638 for Democrat Stephen A. Douglas.
Kentucky's preference for Bell was not altogether
surprising.

The issues of slavery and secession had thorough-

ly divided the state, with Southern support most vocal in
western and southern Kentucky, while Unionist sentiment
prevailed in the northern and eastern portions of the state)
The typical Kentuckian in 1860 was loyal to the Union, yet
believed in state rights.

He recognized the existence of

slavery, yet owned no slaves.

Many of the state's customs

were founded in the traditional Southern lifestyle, although
Kentucky's moderate climate and rolling terrain hindered the
formation of a powerful plantation aristocracy.

Consequent-

ly, the slave population remained relatively small.
tucky was, thus, a mixture of North and South

Ken-

and chose to

side with Bell, whose party committed itself only to preserve
the Union.

This narrow platform, noncommittal on the major

1James E. Copeland, "Where Were the Kentucky Unionists
and Secessionists?" The Register of the Kentucky Historical
Society, 71 (Oct. 1973), 357, 159-61. Hereafter cited as
Register.
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Counties with fewest white Union volunteers as a percentage
of the 1860 population
4/

Ii

11

•

KENTUCKY
•••• •
,..-•';
'
-:;
-'7,......k.
.
'
•. • • .,:'
•••:,.....;....
; s• • • ..•4-•,.
• '•t
. •
_
•..

;•••••••,,.._

0

•,
—;10•4""—...-

1.1i ••
I

....

..."

••••• •
•••••11

•••- t

'''
!..
—....4.04[41..1.04.
,•
i .•••.•
•••••• ..-...•••
/
,,
-t
.......•

....

..*

.

% •••• '
.....

qt.... _ ...,....

•••••••
Misr.: • •
,,,•,

• 640

..--- itt......:•../ - •
• s

..."
.
.„
.
•..

,, „••• • ;

•

,.,...
.e...Ns,.

•

....•
.1141.• i'

....woo,'

•• 7'.
ve •• et.

r

,

.

...... t • t 't
'

t

i

,
...... .
•0.../

:

li•

s ....3...

•

.

.. • 0 • • •
.0

".
...•••
1
', 0 • • • .,

,;......

......
••

0
- ••
•
"KIS

•
et

•

Counties with most white Union volunteers as a percPntacie
of the 1860 population
.1

KENTUCKY

...•••••

. •trt•..•••• ,.•••
0 •••••••

•'••

‘‘os:.

•

1.
c ••••••

.10,100:
•••••
•••••a
01.
1•••••••
••

I?

IS

Copeland, "Kentucky Unionists and Secessionists?"
Register, 71 (Oct. 1973), 359-60.

••

4
issues of the day, satisfied most Kentuckians and was characteristic of the state's political stance in the months
ahead.
Since several Southern states had threatened secession
if the presidency went to the Republican railsplitter from
Illinois, the big question was which way would Kentucky go
if the nation split?

The Louisville Democrat chided Kentuck-

ians who sought to use Lincoln's election as a stepping
stone for leaving the Union.

"Lincoln can do no harm to

anybody. . . . A little wisdom and statesmanship, instead
of folly and sectional temper
now."

. will avert all the evils

The Frankfort Commonwealth agreed, declaring that the

country would endure his tenure and that of others after him.
"Give Mr. Lincoln a chance."2

But the lower South did not

give Lincoln a chance, as seven states seceded from the
Union, precipitating a political crisis in Kentucky.
Responsibility for guiding Kentucky through this turbulent period fell to Governor Beriah Magoffin.

A Democrat

elected in 1859, Magoffin was an avowed Southern sympathizer
who defended state rights, considered the institution of
slavery as the ideal condition for blacks, yet opposed any
immediate withdrawal from the Union by Kentucky.3

Southern-

ers hoped that Magoffin, as the state's highest officia
l,

2Frankfort Tr -Weekly Yeoman, Nov. 17, 1860. Even Magoffin conceded that Lincoln's election was no cause for secession. Louisville Democrat, Nov. 12, 1860; Frankfort Commonwealth, Nov. 12, 1860, quoted in New York Times, Nov. 13, 1860.
3House Journal, Dec. 6, 1859, 35.

5

could use his influence to sway opinion to their cause, and
on January 17, 1861, Magoffin stated:
The people of Kentucky will never consent to remain
in this Confederacy, now abandoned by a large portion
of the slaveholding members. .
. Kentucky will not
and ought not to submit; to the principles and policy
avowed by the Republican party, bLq will resist, and
resist to the death, if necessary.'
The Governor's message was cheered by pro-Southe7n forces
in the state

but was by no means representative of the

entire population of Kentucky.

John Cur(' of Louisville

wrote that Kentucky would never leave the Union b cause
secession was "open rebellicm and downright treason."5
Kentuckians continued to debate the issue of secession

but

were soon overshadowed by a fiery group of South Carolinians,
who, on Apri' 12, 1861, opened fire on Fort Sumter, the
Federal cv ,:-rison in Charleston harbor.

The Civil War had

begtr
Li
Union.

7.n wasted no time in gathering support for the
He issued a call to all states for troops to suppress

the rebellion.

Speaking for Kentucky, Magoffin responded:

. I say emphatically Kentucky will furnish no troops
for the wicked purpose of subdoing
states."

[sic] her sister Southern

Magoffin's blunt reply received support throughout

4Frankfort Tr -Weekly Yeoman, Jan. 18, 1861.
5John Curd to Mr. Cornell, Jan. 26, 1861, John Curd
Papers (Manuscripts Dil.rision, The Filson Club, Louisville,
Kentucky).
6House Journal, May 7, 1861, 12; The War of the Rebellion: A Complilation of the Official RecorTg CiT the Union
and Confederate Armies-T128 vols., Washington, 1880-1901),
Ser. III, Vol. I, 70. Hereafter cited as OR.

6

Kentucky.

The Frankfort Tr -Weekly Yeoman reported that

with ". . . all quarters in the state heard from, Governor
Magoffin's response . . . refusing to send troops for the
invasion of the South is heartily endorsed."7

Another more

pro-Southern newspaper carried a slightly different governor's reply:

"Tell old Abe to go to Hell, and I'll go to

my dinner."8
While the politicians debated union or secession, both
sides saw the importance of the state from a military
standpoint.

A Confederate Kentucky could potentially con-

trol two vital rivers, the Ohio and Mississippi, which would
afford the South a very defensible position against Union
attack west of the Cumberland Mountains.
Kentucky was a must.

For Lincoln,

He told Orville Browning, "I think

to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole
game.u 9

With both Lincoln and Confederate President Jeffer-

son Davis making valiant efforts to swing the state's support
for their respective cause, the Kentucky legislature chose
instead a more reasonable alternative for a grossly divided
state:

neutrality.

As April drew to a close, Kentucky's neutral stance
prompted the Louisville Journal to declare, "There can be

7
Frankfort Tr -Weekly Yeoman, April 16, 1861.
8Benjamin F. Stevenson, Kentucky Neutrality in 1861
(Cincinnati, [n.d.]), 9. This was a paper read before the
Ohio Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion
of the United States, June 2, 1886.
9

Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham
Lincoln (8 vols., New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953), IV, 532.

7

no such thing as neutrality in a contest for the extinction
of the Government. . . . They have the power of choosing,
but not of evading a choice."10

But John J. Crittenden,

a leading Kentucky Congressman, reaffirmed his belief in
the state as a neutral when he wrote a son,
Kentucky has not seceded, &, I believe never kill.
She loves the Union & will cling to it as long as
possible. . . . I trust it will continue to be her
determination to keep out of the strife--and . . .
to satisfy the position of a friendly neutral . .
between the belligerents."11
With actual fighting between Northern and Southern
armies already occurring in other areas, Kentuckians could
only guess how long it would be before their neutrality
would fall before the marching of troops and firing of
guns.

Increased public pressure prompted Magoffin, on May

20, to issue an executive proclamation which forbade the
movement of armed forces upon the soil of Kentucky until
authorized by the legislature or the governor.12

Once again,

Magoffin's actions evoked editorial rebuttal.
Governor Magoffin having failed to lead Kentucky
into secession, has returned from his wanderings
southward to the half-way house of neutrality, where
he proposes for the present t remain. . . . The
Governor talks as if Kentucky were an independent
kingdom, of which he is at the head. . . ."13

10New York Times, April 26, 1861.
11John J. Crittenden to George
B. Crittenden, April 30,
1861, John Jordan Crittenden Papers (Manuscript Division,
The Filson Club).
12Thomas Speed, The Union Cause in Kentucky, 1860-65
(New York, 1907), 48.
13New York Times, May 22, 1861.

8

The Kentucky legislature, meeting in May, chose to
continue the neutrality policy, alleging it was the surest
guarantee of peace.14

But most Kentuckians realized that

neutrality in a war between states and families could not
last, and as weeks passed, the chance of a successful secessionist movement grew less likely.

If Kentucky was going

to side with the Confederacy, Southern sentiment would have
forced a move months earlier when her sister states did so.
Such was not the case, and Kentucky, although a silent
neutral, generally supported the Union cause.

By the end

of summer, this support became obvious.
Special Congressional elections were slated for June
20, with the outcome promising to be indicative of Kentucky's
preference for the Union or Confederacy.

As election day

neared, Northern newspapers again broached the subject of
neutrality.
opinion.

A New York Times editorial typified Union

"In the confusion of these times, there is no

utter fallacy as the idea which seems to have taken possession in Kentucky .

. of the neutrality of states."15

Through intense propaganda efforts such as this, nine Unionist representatives were elected, with only one seat going
to a Secessionist candidate.

On August 5, election returns

for Kentucky's General Assembly showed the Unionist

14J. Stoddard Johnston, Kentucky, in Clement A. Evans,
ed., Confederate Military History (13 vols., New York, 1962;
first published Atlanta, 1
. , IX, 24.
15New York Times, May 12, 1861.

9

candidates holding a decided edge in both the House (76-24)
and Senate (27-11).16

Also, before ending the May session,

the state legislature created a five member military board,
whose purpose was organizing and arming the "Home Guards,"
the local militia. 17

On the surface, this action seemed

:cespcnsible, yet the military board was solidly pro-Union,
and it armed many Union sympathizers, under the preLensc
of preserving Kentucky's neutrality.18

Thus, with Jnion

men controlling both the state legislature and ni'itary
board, and with the rising tide of Unionist support across
the state, as evidenced by the recent elections, Magoffin
and secessionists were definitely in the minority.
Lincoln had been kept informed as to the developing
events in Kentucky from
wave of Unionist ser.

onset of war, and, riding the

.int, he decided the time right to

bolster Kentuck\'. attarthment to the Federal government.
He selected Lieutenant William "Bull" Nelson to perform a
"special service" within Kentucky.

On July 1, 1861, Nelson

receiv,
id orders to muster three infantry regiments from

16Lowell H. Harrison, "Governor Magoffin and the
Secession Crisis," Register, 72 (April 1974), 105.
17Senate Journal, May 18, 1861, 96; House Journal,
May 21, 1861, 153. Originally only three members, the
Governor, Inspector-General, and Chief Engineer, were to
sit on the Board, but after considerable debate Magoffin's
name was removed and a five member Military Board was
established on May 24, 1861.
18Senate Journal, May 20, 1861.

10

southeastern Kentucky, a known stronghold of Unionist spirit,
designated for service in eastern Kentucky)-9
Eastern Kentucky is a geographic area from Bracken
County southward to Whitley County and eastward to the stateline, consisting of 38 counties, which in 1860 had a population of 214,929, over 90% of whom were white.

Only 18,079

slaves were located in this mountainous area, the majority
in Bath, Fleming, Montgomery, and Mason counties, each
with over 2,000 slaves.

These counties were, however, the

exception rather than the rule, for 17 counties in eastern
Kentucky had fewer than 200 slaves each, and eastern Kentucky,
by and large, supported the Union cause.2°
In the Crab Orchard area, Nelson, with the aid of
Thomas E. Bramlette and Frank L. Wolford, began raising
troops.

By late August, four regiments of Union men, though

still categorized as "Home Guards," whose expressed purpose
was maintaining Kentucky's neutrality, were encamped and
armed on the farm of a staunch Unionist, Richard Robinson.
While denouncing Nelson's acts as a violation of the state's
neutrality, Southern leaders responded by recruiting men in
and around the Prestonburg area, in Floyd County.

Their

leader was a portly politician, Humphrey Marshall, under
whose guidance several small pockets of secessionist
sentiment in eastern Kentucky sprang up.

Regardless of

190R., Ser. I, Vol. IV, 251-52.
20Lewis and Richard Collins, History of Kentucky (2
vols., Covington, 1874), II, 258-61.

11

Counties in Kentucky, 1860, with a division of eastern Kentucky
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which side violated the state's neutrality first, Kentucky's
days as a neutral were numbered.
In a last ditch effort to forestall bloodshed in the
state, Magoffin telegraphed messages to Lincoln and Davis
in late August, 1861.

Magoffin cited the fact that armed

men were then stationed in Kentucky, without the consent
of state authorities, and he urged the removal of any and
all military forces from Kentucky.21

Lincoln replied,

. I do not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky
that the force should be removed beyond her limits; and,
with this impression, I must respectively decline to so
remove it.u 22

Davis responded, ". . . the Government of

the Confederate States of America neither intends nor
desires to disturb the neutrality of Kentucky."

But he

contended that neutrality ". . . must be strictly maintained
between both parties. .
News of the South's victory at Manassas Junction,
Virginia, spurred a renewed Southern hope for a Confederate
Kentucky.

Numerous accounts told of Confederate troops

movements into the state from Tennessee as part of a massive
offensive.

The National Union of Winchester, Kentucky, on

21Frank Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary
of American Events (12 vors-7, New York, 1861-68), III,
fg-30; OR., Ser. I, Vol. IV, 378.
22Basler, ed., Works of Lincoln, IV, 497; Senate Journal, Sept. 5, 1861, 42.
23Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Government (2 vols., New York, 19TAT first punished 1881),
I, 190; OR., Ser. I, Vol. IV, 396; Senate Journal, Sept. 5,
1861, 447-

13

August 10, 1861, reported that several hundred Confederates
had already crossed into Kentucky, via Cumberland Gap, and
were marhig on Parboursville, and then possibly Richmond.24
But the Confederate f:orces in east Tennessee h-d not yet
entered KentucAy.

They were, however, being assembled at

Ynoxville, Tennessee, under the leadership of a form.?r
Tennessee politicLan, Brigadier General Felix K. Zollicoffer.
Zolliooffer's appointment to command in the east
Tennessee district was for the expressed purpose of countering the 'Home Guards" at Camp Dick Robinson, who, Confederate
authorites believed, could at any moment invade eastern
Tennessee and control the strategic Cumberland Gap.

On

August 29, 1861, Zollicoffer telegrapher''. Confederate
Adjutant-Inspector General Samuel Cooper in Richmond,
Virginia, that Camp Dick Robinson had at least 4,000 well
armed men, with new recruits arIiving

ly.

He added that

many Unionists from east Tennessee had been and were crossing over into Kentucky to get arms from the Union camp, all
of which made for a

)tentially explosive situation.25

How-

ever, the eastern Kentucky-Tennessee area was not the scene
of the first c'ash in the state, for the western region along
the Mississip..i River was to claim that distinction.

Move-

ments by ?)oth Confederate and Union forces made that sector
a powderkeg, with each side trying to outmaneuver the other

24 Winchester (Ky.) National Union, ugust 10, 1861,
quoted in New York Times, August 11, 1861.
250R., Ser. I, Vol. IV, 397.

14

for locations of strategic importance.

The result would

be Kentucky's entrance into the Civil War.

II.

EASTERN KENTUCKY:

THE INITIAL STRUGGLE

On September 4, 1861, Major General Leonidas Polk, C.S.A.
disregarded Kentucky's neutrality and occupied Columbus,
a strategic town on the bank of the Mississippi River.

Union

leaders propagandized Polk's move, saying it rivaled the
firing on Fort Sumter,and news of the "Confederate Invasion
of Kentucky" spread quickly.

Confederate President Jefferson

Davis defended the action as "absolutely necessary" for the
security of secessionists in southwestern Kentucky,26 but the
entire incident was perhaps summed up best by the Woodford
Pennant; "The rubicon is c7rossed. . • • n27
With neutrality broken, both Union and Confederate forces
sought to occupy key locations throughout the state.

Zolli-

coffer immediately sent three regiments through Cumberland Gap
into southeastern Kentucky, with a promise of others soon to
follow.

28

A native Tennessean, a journalist and politician,

Zollicoffer was inexperienced with command.

In fact, his only

prior military duty was a brief and undistinguished stint in the

26Davis, Rise and Fall of Confederate Government, I, 396.
27
Woodford (Ky.) Pennant, quoted in Wilson P. Shortridge,
"Kentucky Neutrality in 1861," The Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, IX (March 1923), 287n.
28
OR., Ser. I, Vol. IV, 404.
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Seminole War.

With the outbreak of civil war, he declined

the rank of Major General of the Tennessee militia, citing
his lack of a formal military education.

Yet surprisingly

he shortly thereafter accepted the rank of Brigadier General
in the Confederacy, with assignment in the east Tennessee
district.29
Zollicoffer's command, with headquarters at Knoxville,
consisted of seven infantry regiments and four cavalry battalions, the majority of whom were Tennesseans.30

Zollicoffer

left two regiments at Knoxville and one at Cumberland Gap,
while sending the remaining troops and a battery of guns 15
miles into southeastern Kentucky to Cumberland Ford, renamed
Camp Buckner.

By mid-September, Zollicoffer took up a northern

trek towards Barboursville, in Knox County.

When his advance

force of 800 men entered the town at daylight on September 19,
they found 300 Union soldiers, apparently unaware of the
ConfederJAe movement.

A brief skirmish ensued with the

Confederates driving the surprised Federals from the town.
Casualty reports showed 12 Union soldiers killed and 2 prisoners taken, with the number of wounded unknown.

Zollicoffer

lost only 2 killed and 3 wounded.31
At Camp Dick Robinson, Brigadier General George Thomas
received reports of the Confederate advance, but the Union

29
Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography
(20 vols., New York, 1928-36), XX, 65T-760; Ezra J. Warner,
Generals in Grey (Baton Rouge, 1959), 349-50.
Ser. I, Vol. IV, 409.
31Ibid., 199.
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commander was not overly concerned with Zollicoffer's minute
offensive overtones, confident that he would retreat to
Cumberland Gap if confronted by a superior union force.

The

lack of supplies in Barboursville suspended temporarily any
thoughts 7o1licoffer had for moving into the heartland of
Kentucky, as on September 24 he noted that there
24 hours ration of bread in the entire cilmp $ 2

WAS

not

When foraging

parties returnea with provisions for a week, Zollicloffer
decided to continue hls movement into Kentucky, theorizing
that the best defense of east Tennessee was a forward movement
tow.7amp rick Robinson, 75 miles to the north.33

His

actions wore premature, though, as Ge.leral Albert S. Johnston,
Confederate Commanding General in the West, had written Zollicoffer the previous di

'A forward movem

position at this time cannot be made

At 4:00 a.m.

September

The message did not
ys r

reach Zollicoffer until he was two

from your present

the march.35

Co1o!.....1 James Rains led

his 11th Tenne2see regiment to Laurel Bridge, on the London
road.

Three cctvalry compaies and a section of artillery

accompanied } -tins, as we

as a battalion of Colonel W. S.

Statham's 15th

infantry.

MiSf

ippi

A second wave of Zolli-

coffer's forces, Cc onel D. H. Cumming's 19th Tennessee
Infantry, two cavalry companies and several empty wagons were

32Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34Ibid., 423.
35Ibid., 429.
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sent to the Goose Creek salt mines in Clay County, 17 miles
to the east.

Designed to divert attention away from the move

on the salt works, the Confederates planned to surprise the
several hundred Union soldiers encamped at Laurel Bridge, 50
miles south of Camp Dick Robinson, and precipatate alarm for
an attack on that bastion.

The diversion was a marked success,

as Federal pickets surrounding Laurel Bridge were quickly
driven in and the Confederates captured three prisoners along with 8,000 cartridges, 25,000 caps, 3 kegs of powder,
6 barrels of salt, 2 wagons and teams, 3 other horses, 25 pairs
of shoes, and several auns.36

The second wing sent to the

salt works returned to Camp Buckner without incident, with
200 barrels of the badly needed food preservative.
Confederate activities in Kentucky were not wholly confined to the southeastern portions of the state.

Small groups

of secessionists had been organized in the northeast during
the summer under the direction of Humphrey Marshal1.37

Reports

of his ardent recruiting speeches abounded, with Marshall even
projected as combining forces with Zollicoffer in an attempt
to overthrow the state legislature and establish a provisional
government friendly to the Confederacy.

38

During September,

Marshall did lead an abortive march on Frankfort with 500

36 Ibid., 202.
37
Speed, Union Cause in Kentucky, 32; Edward Conrad Smith,
The Borderland—TH—The—TiTrii—War (New York, 1927), 292.
380R.,
Ser. I, Vol. IV, 273; William R. Balch, The Life of
James AbFam Garfield (Philadelphia, 1881), 127.
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followers, but returned to the safety of the eastern Kentucky mountains when he learned that Unionists and "Home
Guards" had been informed of the move. 39
A West Point graduate, Marshall had served as Minister
to China in the Millard Fillmore administration, and was
four times elected to Congress on the Whig and Know-Nothing
40
tickets.

Standing 5'11" and weighing nearly 300 pounds,

Marshall was physically unfit for active command in mountainpus eastern Kentucky.41

But as a politician, Marshall

had developed strong ties with prominent Southern leaders,
and during October he traveled to Richmond in an attempt to
secure a personal command.

Until his return, Marshall

placed John Williams in charge of recruiting additional
men in Floyd County.
Williams, one of Marshall's closest friends, early
aligned himself with the Confederacy.

Through his rigorous

recruiting efforts, 1,000 men enlisted for the Southern
cause, most of whom lacked arms and supplies, yet were

390R., Ser. I, Vol. IV, 272; Mai Flournoy Van Deren,
"Humphrey Marshall" (master's thesis, Louisiana State University, 1936), 34-35; Congressional Globe, 37 Congress, 2d
session, Pt. 2, 1214.
"Warner, Generals in Grey, 212; Malone, ed., Dictionary
of American Biography, XII, 310-11.
41Basil
W. Duke, Reminiscences of General Basil W. Duke
(Garden City, New York, 1911), 143; Biographical Sketch of
Humphrey Marshall, 1812-73, Charles Lanman Collection (Manuscripts Division, The Filson Club).
Marshall's enormous
size led to a jingle known throughout Confederate ranks:
"Humphrey Marshall, he's our boss, big as hell, brave as a
hoss." Carol Crowe-Carraco, The Big Sandy (Lexington, 1979),
36; Henry P. Scalf, Historic Floyd (Prestonburg, Kentucky,
1950), 33.
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eager for a fight.

They soon had their chance.

Scouting

reports placed 4,000 scattered Federals between West Liberty
and Hazel Green, heading for Camp Dick Robinson, and Williams,
realizing the opportunity to strike a divided foe, proceeded
42
immediately to West Liberty.
In the early morning hours of October 23, the opposing
forces met.

Brigadier General William Green, U.S.A., reported

that at four in the morning his men made a surprise attack on
West Liberty which was resisted by several hundred men.

They

were driven off easily, and the Union troops entered the town.43
Major Richard Hawes, C.S.A., and a future Confederate governor
of Kentucky, reported that an advance guard of Williams, 60
strong, attacked a large Federal force at West Liberty.

The

Southerners were hidden in the bushes on a hillside and killed
30 Federals, with no loss of Confederate life.44

Leeland Hath-

away, commanding a Confederate company, recorded his eyewitness
account of the affair.

Hathaway had positioned his men behind a

dense thicket and had instructed them to await his signal before
firing.

The Federals advanced slowly up the road, until they

discovered the hidden Confederates.
wounding two of Hathaway's men.

The Yankees fired a volley,

But the gunfire was not returned

until the "bluecoats" were no more than 50 yards away.

Hatha-

way then called "ready, fire" and the small company of less than
20 men discharged a deadly volley.

42
OR., Ser. I, Vol. IV, 508.
43Ibid., 214.
44

Ibid., 508.

The Union line held together

21
momentarily, then retreated.

Flush with an apparent victory,

Hathaway's men charged the fleeing Federals
to camp.45

but soon returned

Such was the skirmish at West Liberty, an incon-

sequential battle, fought by ill-prepared troops, but Williams'
forces beamed with pride at the standoff and rejoiced even
more when ic was learned that Humphrey Marshall was returning
from Richmond with an independent command in eastern Kentucky
46
and the rank of Brigadier General.
By October, 1861, Lincoln had devised several plans of
attack upon the South, one of which involved eastern Kentucky.
Simultaneous with a coastal movement on the Carolinas, Lincoln
proposed an attack on Cumberland Gap and western Virginia.

He

z'ed tc, divide Zollicoffer and Marshall, while also forcing
them to retreat southward.47

In fact, on October 1, Zollicoffer

--?.d word that 2,5'r.) "Lincolnites" assembled near Louisa,
,awrence County
to invade and c

.ortheastern Kentucky, were threatening
ol . !-c: vital Sandy Valley.48

It was also

45Leeland Hathaway Diary, Leeland hathaway Recollections
(The Southern Historical Collection, University of North
(.:arolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina), 26-32.
460R., Ser. I, Vol.
IV, 495; J. Stoddard Johnston,
Fentucky, 248. Johnston wrote that Marshall was given command
the "Army of Southwestern Virginia and Eastern Kentucky."
.s could have been Marshall's own terminology for his
F.dependent command. Mr. Withers to Colonel Stuart, July 21,
1861, William Dabney Stuart Papers (Virginia Military Institute,
..,exington
, Virginia). Special Orders No. 232 from the Acting
Inspector General's Office in Richmond called for Stuart to
proceed to Jeffersonville, Virginia,and report to Brigadier
General Marshall. Once again, Marshall's rank could have been
one of his own fixation.
47Basler,
ed., Collected Works of Lincoln, TV, 542, 545.
480R., Ser. I,
Vol. IV, 433-44.
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reported that troops from Camp Dick Robinson were moving on
Cumberland Gap, with two regiments already encamped between
London and the Rockcastle River.49
When Zollicoffer sought permission to go forth and meet
the Union troops from Camp Dick Robinson, Johnston replied,
"Exercise your own discretion in attacking the enemy."50
Obviously, the Confederate effort in eastern Kentucky could
not afford a disastrous defeat and forfeiture of Cumberland
Gap, but if Zollicoffer could check the Union offensive by
active defensive maneuvers, additional

time could he secured

for the arrival of badly needed men and equipment.

The lack

of sufficient provisions and adequate transportation for
4,500 men delayed Zollicoffer's advance for several days, but
at midnight on October 7, Union scouts informed Thomas that
Zollicoffer had begun an advance towards central Kentucky.51
Three days later, a forward party of Confederates established
a temporary camp on a hill nine miles north of London.

The

hill, in Rockcastle County, would become a battlefield less
than a week later.
As Zolliccffer passed through London, a small skirmish
between pickets occurred, with only nominal casualties on each
side.

The fight, however, served notice to the Confederate

commander that he was nearing Rockcastle Hills, where Brigadier
General Albin Schoepf, Colonel Theophilus Garrard, and 4,000

49Ibid.,
•
434, 201.
50Ibid., 435.
51 Ibid.,
•
309, 462-

24

Union troops from Camp Dick Robinson were intrenched on
Wildcat Mountain, awaiting the attack.

Zollicoffer, upon a

first glance at the Federal oosition, called it ". . . a
natural fortification, almost inaccessible," hut it did not
deter his plan of attaek.62
On October 21, Zollicoffer cautiously approached Camp
Wildcat, the Union coition in the aockcastle Hills.

A dense

forest encircjng the Hills concealed, for the most part, his
advance.

Colonel Taz Newman's 17th Tennessee Infantry and

Colonel Curming's 19th Tennessee Infantry prepared for a
frontal assault, H'-tile 10 companies of men moved to the left.
Newman's men had closed to wi'hin Pfl yards of the Federal
position wnen
volley.

eir ranks wex

d by a heavy Union

They moved forwarc, a'beit slcwer, without I:1.ring

a shot, groping for protr
musket fire.

the galling r
..r1 50 yards

When thee

the Confederates fi_re.

\olley and intens.

and
le Union lines,
rontinued

for over half an hour.
With the battle

q.

furiously, Newman, showing no

fear, led four compani;Ls galIAntly ufJ., tIle steep hillside.
Some of the men reached the Feder ,1 works but, being destitute
of cartridges and coming un

,creasng fire, were forced

to fall back and regroup.53
Intermittent firing ::.:-.)ntinued throughoW the day, but
when Zollicoffer realiz,

52
Ibid., 210.
53Ibid., 213-14.

that the hilltor, Federal position
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could not be taken without a heavy loss of Confederate life,
he decided to retreat to Cumberland Ford.

The Confederates

lost 11 killed and 42 wounded, while Union casualties were
listed at 4 killed and 18 wounded.54

By October 25, Zolli-

coffer was back at Camp Buckner, having failed in his first
battlefield effort, though the battle of Camp Wildcat or
Rockcastle Hills was more of a reconnaisance in force than
a pitched battle.

Zollicoffer could only wait and see if his

active defensive gestures aould slow the Union advance.55
Zollicoffer's repluse at Rockcastle Hills demonstrated
the difficulties of conducting operations in eastern Kentuckv.
With numerous mountains to traverse, some often insurmountable,
the key to victory resided with obtaining and maintaining a
defensive position, awaiting the attack, and replusing it.
Furthermore, provisions in the area were scarce, and the
farther north Zollicoffer tried to move, the longer his supply
line became, with the entire route being in hostile Unionist
territory.

Yet, if Zollicoffer chose to remain in the Cumber-

land Gap area, he lost the advantage of surprise.

As the

Federals advanced southward through the state, they undoubtedly
would increase their ranks, as evidenced by the dominant
Unionist sentiment in Kentucky.56

54Ib1d., 205,210.
55Moore, ed., Rebellion Record, III, 226-31. Various
newspaper reports of the battle are also contained here.
56Thomas
L. Connelly, Army of the Heartland; The Army of
Tennessee, 1861-62 (Baton Rouge,—T9T7T, 88.
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Following the Confederate retreat, rumors circulated
that Zollicoffer would be replaced.

Because of the immense

importance that Cumberland Gap played in Southern strategy,
only one name was mentioned repeatedly as his replacement-General Robert E. Lee.57

Union leaders feared that Lee

would be sent to Kentucky with a powerful arrly and sweep
through the entire state, a view echc30 by the New York
Times.58

However, if such a change was seriously contemplated,

it did not materialize and Zollicoffer remained in command
at Cumberland Gap.
Zollicoffer did, however, become alarmed that the Federals
might counterattack before additional men could be sent forward
to strengthen his army.

To protect this vital area, Johnston

ordered Brigadier Generals L. P. Walker and William Carroll
with their respective troops to Knoxville to bolster the
defenses of Cumberland Gap and the various mountain passes
in the area.
and

several

Zollicoffer also received additional munitions
batteries of artillery.

Johnston had correctly

surmised the situation, as Schoepf had already decided to
advance on Cumberland Gap.59
With the arrival of additional men and supplies, Zollicoffer bolstered his defenses at the Gap, but there were far
more mountain passes through which a Union force could penetrate into eastern Tennessee than he could adequately defend,

570R., Ser. I, Vol. IV,
206.
58New York Times,
Oct. 29, 1861.
590R., Ser. I, Vol. IV,
207.
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most notably the roads from Williamsburg, Kentucky, to
Jacksborough, Tennessee, and from Monticello, Kentucky, to
Jamestown, Tennessee.

The former was the most westerly

route the Federals would use to invade the Volunteer State,
for they would be edging precariously close to Johnston's
range of coverage from Bowling Green.

Zollicoffer

thus

concluded that the most desirable Federal route was the
Williamsburg-Jacksborough Pike, and he scattered four
cavalry companies to the west in an attempt to ascertain
whether or not the Federa7s would try to outflank Cumberland
Gap.60

His efforts soon were rewarded when one of the cavalry

companies captured a Federal spy who confessed that it was
indeed the Federal plan to send two or three regiments
against Cumberland Gap, hoping to draw Zollicoffer out for
a fight, while the principal Union forces moved by both the
roads Zollicoffer had suspected.
total Union force at 20,000.61

The spy estimated the

Upon receiving this informa-

tion, Zollicoffer dispatched several regiments west to
fortify the main passes.

The scene of fighting, thus, was

shifting from eastern Kentucky to eastern Tennessee.
Residents of the Volunteer State were genuinely concerned
for the safety of their state.

After Zollicoffer's advance

into central Kentucky had been replused, they feared a massive Union counterattack upon the Confederate commander for
the purpose of seizing the east Tennessee-Virginia railroad,

487.
61Ibid., 490.
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the vital communication key with the east.62

Zollicoffer

sent urgent appeals for additional men and artillery
to
strengthen his position in the mountains, while at the
same time ordering four regiments of infantry to
fortify
the passes where he expected the Union assaults.63

This

rapid and substantial movement of men westward result
ed
in Thomas receiving alarming reports that Zollicoffer
had
been reinforced to a present force of not less than
20,000
men.64 Although regarding that report as an inaccu
rate
count of the Southern force, Thomas displayed his conser
vative
approach to warfare as he recalled his advanced troops
to
Camp Dick Robinson.

Even if Zollicofter had only half that

number, Thomas could ill afford to be caught in a fight
with several units of his men dispersed throughout easter
n
Kentucky.

He would wait for a better opportunity to

c

the Confederates.
Confederate scouting reports confirmed the "nion withdrawal, and by November 4 Zollicoffer realized that the
suspected Union attack had become a feint.

He then proposed

to Johnston that it would be in the best intere-- of
the
Confederacy if his force was more closely aligned with th
of General

Simon Bolivar Buckner at Bowling green.

If therefore it should meet with your approval, I
will
as rapidly as possible, endeavor to so fortify tl!e
Cumberland Gap that the smallest possible force will

62Ibid., 496.
502.
328.
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be necessary there; will simultaneously endeavor
to fortify or thoroughly blockade the passes near
Jacksborough . . . and concentrate them [troops]
upon some point in the open country near Jamestown,
with the view of advancing towards Danville.65
Zollicoffer was once again considering an offensive
into Kentucky.
Zollicoffer had left Cumberland Gap for Jamestown with
five regiments, a battery of artillery and a small group
of cavalry.

By November 7, he was at Jacksborough, where

he acquired four additional regiments, as well as news that
a small force of 300-400 Federals were encamped just east
of Monticello, the only known Yankees south of the Cumberland
River.66
Zollicoffer left the regiments of Colonels Churchwell
and Rains at Cumberland Gap to complete the breastworks.
On November 10, Churchwell received information that General
William Nelson was advancing on Piketon.67

Williams wrote

Marshall that he had evacuated Prestonburg because his men
were "unarmed and unorganized" for a fight, with not more
68
than two rounds of ammunition per man.
treat, a fight ensued between
over four hours.

During the re-

1son and Williams which lasted

both sides subquently claimed victory.

As Nelson advanced along a narrow mountain road
leading to Piketon, the banks of which were covered

65
Ibid., 516-17.
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67
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thickly with timber and undergrowth, Williams placed a
portion of his men along a rocky ridge 100 feet above the
road where they were completely hidden from the view of
the advancing Federals.69

Nearly all the Confederates were

armed with double-barreled shotguns, and the order had been
given not to fire until they heard the crack of an officer's
pistol.

The Federals continued the march, unaware of the

ambush that lay ahead.

Suddenly from the trees there came

a crack, and the hidden enemy poured round after round of
buckshot into the Union ranks.

Caught completely by sur-

prise, Nelson's men became panic stricken, yet, instinctively
returned a volley, their shot chipping the rocks and trees
above.

The battle raged for over an hour with Nelson at-

tempting to regroup his men and bring up an artillery
battery to dislodge the pesky rebels.

Finally, Nelson

opened fire with his artillery and ordered a charge on the
Confederate position atop the mountain.

Because of their

superior numbers, the Federals were able to outflank the
rebels, who, their ammunition exhausted, fled down the
backside of the mountain and continued their retreat to
Piketon.

The battle of Piketon or Ivy Mountain left 10

Confederates dead and 18 wounded.

Marshall cited the clash

70
as "a very decided success."

69W. T. Lafferty, ed., "Civil War Reminiscences of
John Aker Lafferty," Register, 59 (Jan. 1961), 5; OR.,
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Marshall, who had been establishing his new headquarters
at Abingdon, Virginia, proceeded to Pound Gap to meet his
retreating forces.

Thus, by mid-November, Union troops

within eastern Kentucky had succeeded in driving both
Confederate units back, Zollicoffer into Tennessee and
Marshall into Virginia.

Williams, in a letter to Marshall,

predicted that Nelson would move next on the VirginiaTennessee railroad, but the Federals did not pursue Marshall
and Williams.

Two weeks later writing from Pound Gap,

Marshall stated that the enemy had fallen back to Prestonburg.71
With Confederate forces in eastern Kentucky on the
defensive, many secessionists in the western part of the state
called for the establishment of a Confederate government
of Kentucky.

It would, in the words of an eminent historian,

. . . not only give a rallying point frsr Kentuckians,
who could now join the Confedeiacy without being
technically traitors to their state, but it would
also solve many legal and administrative proem2
also confronting the Confederate commandoes."'
Meeting in Russellville, 115 delegates from 6b counties
came together, and because of the widespread belief throughout the South that Kentucky supported the Confederacy and
was for secession, a Confederate government of Kentucky was
established on November 19, 1861.

The Confederate Congress

later admitted Kentucky as the 13th state.

Bowling Green

71Ibid., 229-30, vol. VII, 722-23.
72E. Merton
Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment
in Kentucky (Chapel Hill, 1926), 136.
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became the Confederate capital with George Johnson serving
73
as Governor.
Yet if Southern enthusiasm was running high in the
southcentral part of the state, Confederates in eastern
Kentucky were disspirited.

On November 30, Brigadier

General Humphrey Marshall, as a matter of personal pride,
tendered his resignation to Confederate Secretary of War,
Judah Benjamin.

While in Richmond a month earlier, Marshall

had sought a guarantee from Davis that his command would
be independent of any others in the area, with Marshall
reporting only to Johnston.

Then Marshall learned that

Davis, unhappy with Zollicoffer's performance thus far, had
appointed a Kentuckian, Major General George B. Crittenden,
to supersede Zollicoffer, the latter still remaining with
the army.

Marshall's gesture, though extreme, typified

many Southerners' reaction to the news of a new commander
in the eastern Kentucky-Tennessee area.

The appointment

threatened to divide Confederate operations in the entire
region.

Davis' personal intervention was a crucial mistake,

one made more vivid less than two months later on the battlefield of Logan's Cross Roads.

73Lowell
H. Harrison, The Civil War in Kentucky
(Lexington, 1975), 358.

III.

AN ACTIVE DEFENSE:

THE BATTLE

OF LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS

On November 11, 1861, the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office in Richmond, Virginia, issued Special Orders No.
216, placing George B. Crittenden in command of the troops in
the east Tennessee district.74

A West Point graduate, Crit-

tenden had served in both the Black Hawk and Mexican wars,
and by 1856 held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the United
States Army.

With the outbreak of civil war, however, he re-

signed his commission and accepted the rank of Brigadier and
later was promoted to Major General in the Confederacy.75
Crittenden's appointment to the east Tennessee district
was a direct result of Jefferson Davis

dissatisfaction with

Zollicoffer, who had failed to maintain an offensive posture
in eastern Kentucky, and had been repulsed at Rockcastle
Hills.

Thus, in an effort to revive the state's waning sup-

pc-t for the Confederacy, Davis offered Crittenden, a native
Kentuckian whose name was widely recognized throughout the
state, command of the rebel forces at Cumberland Gap for
an advance into the Commonwealth.76

740R., Ser. I, Vol. IV, 538.
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Zollicoffer, unaware of the changing circumstances in
Richmond, previously had decided upon another advance into
Kentucky and by mid-November was already moving northward
with nine regiments from Jamestown, Tennessee.

With Crit-

tenden's appointment unknown in the West, Johnston approved
plan whereby Zollicoffer, with his 4,000 men, would establish a camp at Mill Springs, Kentucky, and, if not threatened
by the enemy during the winter months ahead, launch a spring
offensive into the central part of the state.

On November

29, Zollu.coffer arrived at Mill Springs, a small communi...--,
on the southern bank of the Cumberland River.

This vast

winding river was the key to the entire area.

If controlled

by the Confederates, it would be a vital supply line from
Nashville, a faster alternative to poor overland roads.

The

area also had an abundance of crops, forage, and even a
large grist mill, hence the name Mill Springs.

These ele-

ments, combined with the formidable bluffs edging the southern bank of the Cumberland, afforded Zollicoffer an excellent
location for establishing winter quarters for his troops,
while also presenting the Union command with an offensive
threat to central Kentucky.77
At Louisville, Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell,
Union Commander of the Ohio Department, doubted that Zollicoffer would cross the Cumberland in force.

He expected,

rather, that Zollicoffer would attempt no more than a

77Ibid., vol. IV, 243, Vol. VII, 687, 697, 713.
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reconnaissance in force, hoping to force a Union retreat
from the area without risking a major conflict.78

There

were strong differences of opinion in Buell's camp relative
to Zollicoffer's intentions, however, since he had already
outsmarted the Union commanders by leaving Cumberland Gap
and establishing a fortified position on the Cumberland
His active defense would relieve pressure on Johnston
Bowling Green by occupying the full attention of the
troops from Camp Dick Robinson, while he also secured additinal time for men and supplies to be sent to Mill Springs
from Nashville.79
Zollicoffer's position at Mill Springs changed the
entire nature of operations in central and eastern Kentucky.
If his first p7,an of action was an attack on Camp Dick
Robinson, his second plan was surely to hold his own position
on tie Cumberland, for Johnston desired Zollicoffer to remain
in observation of the enemy until such time as he could reenforce his army.80

Johnston's plan was to establish a

strong Confederate line of defense across southern Kentucky,
from the Mississippi River through Bowling Green to Mill
Springs, ending at Cumberland Gap.
In early December, Brigadier General Albin Schoepf was
sent to

watch Zollicoffer and to prevent his crossing of the

78Ibid., Vol. VII, 458.
79Connelly, Army of Heartland, 87, 89.
"William P. Johnston, The Life of General Albert Sidney
Johnston (New York, 1879), 3417
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Cumberland.

After reconnaissance, Schoepf wrote Brigadier

General George Thomas, estimating the rebel army at 9,000
strong.

Before he could finish the letter, Confederate

artillery perched atop the southern bluffs of the Cumberland opened fire on the advanced Union forces, causing an
abrupt end to the communication.81

Zollicoffer also reported

the clash to Johnston, the first of several offensive displays.

Johnston was obviously pleased with Zollicoffer's

actions as he wrote on December 4, "Every move is entirely
approved."82

But he also stated that Zollicoffer should

safeguard the Monticello-Somerset road, on the southern side
of the Cumberland, as it was the most practical road the
enemy would use to advance on Mill Springs.

However, he

acquiesced to Zollicoffer's more thorough knowledge of the
country.

This was vintage Johnston.

Being unfamiliar with

the area in question, he relied on his subordinate's decisions as to what was best for his army.
While Schoepf kept his vigil on Zollicoffer, rumors
circulated of a Confederate attack on central Kentucky.

A

Negro man crossed over to the northern side of the Cumberland
and informed Schoepf that the Confederates had constructed
a large number of boats and were, at any moment, contemplating an attack.83

The expected Confederate offensive

did not materialize, and Buell, in an attempt to downplay

810R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 7-8.
82Ibid., 734.
83Ibid., 473.
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the significance of the Southern force, wrote that Zollicoffer was making only harmless demonstrations.84

But on

December 9, Confederate advance forces were thrown across
the Cumberland, much to the surprise and despair of the
1.etreating Yankees.

Schoepf had been lulled into a false

sense of security by Zollicoffer's apparent defensive
gestures, and the Confederates easily put five infantry
regiments, seven cavalry companies, and four pieces of
artillery across the river.

Zollicoffer's new position,

which he immediately fortified, was at Beech Grove, directly
across the Cumberland from Mill Springs.

Zollicoffer termed

Beech Grove as a "naturally strong" defensive position.85
':,.ollowing his bold move across the Cumberland to Beech
k.rove, Zollicoffer
regarding the imu
which he me.ae

eived Johnston's letter of December 4,
.ce of the Monticello-Somerset road,
n imp

that it was Tohnst

diate reply.

Zollicoffer inferred

.sh that he should have remained at

Mill Springs guarding the road.

But with Schoepf receiving

- eenforcements from Camp Dick Robinson and his means
.,sportation being somewhat limited for a rapid removal,
Zollicoffer felt it impossible to recross the Cumberland
at that particular time.

He tried to bolster support for

hi; move by citing the protection of both 1-A.anks and rear
by the river--the camp resembling a horeshoe--as well as
providing an excellent springboard for operations into

84Ibid.,
•
477.
85Ibid.,
12.
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central Kentucky.86

He viewed Beech Grove as "a much strong-

er natural position for defense than that on the south bank.
u87
I think it should be held at all hazards. . • •
But Zollicoffer perceived that his actions might not
meet with Johnston's approval, and, in fact, the northern
bank was not a better natural location.

There was a marked

difference in elevation between the two river banks, with
the southern cliffs dominating the entire area, and having a
river in the rear, in the view of several historians, trapped
rather than protected the Confederates.

However, Zollicoffer

included in his reply the key word "defense," for by mid
December he had not received the necessary men and supplies
for an immediate offensive into central Kentucky.

As a

consequence, he was seriously contemplating the second phase
of his plan; a defensive stand in winter quarters at Beech
Grove.

With his successful forward movements of the past

month, Zollicoffer had hoped for an opportunity to redeem
himself to Richmond authorities who thought him unqualified
for active command.

Such was not to be the case.

On Decem-

ber 15, Crittenden arrived in Knoxville and assumed overall
command of the Confederate forces in the area.
Crittenden's appointment to the east Tennessee district
was tinted with political favoritism, a charge sustained by
Crittenden's first strategic decision on December 16.

"Marcus J. Wright, "Sketch of General Felix K. Zollicoffer," The Southern Bivouac, II (July 1884), 490.
87OR., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 753.
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Without sufficient knowledge of the area in question and
without communicating with Zollicoffer concerning the reasons
for his crossing the Cumberland, Crittenden ordered Zollicoffer to recross the river to Mill Springs.88

In an attempt

to explain the order to Richmond, Crittenden cited scouting
reports which placed superior numbers of Union forces moving
in front and on the left flank of Beech Grove.89

This fear

was not reflected in Zollicoffer's correspondence, however,
and he did not comply with the message.

Instead he main-

tained his defensive stand at Beech Grove.
Why Zollicoffer chose to remain where he was, disobeying a superior's command, has been an object of controversy.
Bennett Young wrote that Zollicoffer's move to the northern
shore of the Cumberland was without Johnston's approval."
This is erronous, however, since Johnston had approved of
all of Zollicoffer's actions preceeding his move to Beech
Grove, and left the matter of guarding the Monticello-Somerset road to Zollicoffer's discretion.

Later, when Zollicoff-

er informed Johnston on December 9 that he had crossed to
the northern bank, Johnston did not countermand the move.
Second, Crittenden's order to recross the Cumberland
seems to have been a verbal command, as no written record
of the order has been found.

88Ib1d., 769, Vol. LI1,

Zollicoffer could not rely on

t. :I, 239.

89Ibid., Vol. VII, 769.
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the command without personally communicating with Crittenden
which he had tried to do on several occasions.

In his frus-

tration, he wrote to Johnston, "I now receive no responses to
communications addressed to Knoxville with the most important
details. n91

If the order had been telegraphed or written,

Zollicoffer would have recrossed to avoid being in direct
violation of a superior's command and leaving himself open
for charges of insubordination and neglect of duty.
Third, Zollicoffer, aware that Crittenden was unfamiliar
with the strength of the terrain around Mill Springs and
Beech Grove, hoped to convince his superior of the wisdom
of the move when he arrived at Mill Springs.

Zollicoffer's

constructed fortifications at Beech Grove complemented the
defensive characteristics of the terrain on the northern
shore of the Cumberland.
Fourth, Zollicoffer believed that his crossing of the
Cumberland had created consternation among Union generals.
This view was reflected by the New York Tribune which declared that Zollicoffer's move to Beech Grove
. . . showed an unusual enterprise and energy on
his part, as our generals, whom he took completely
by surprise were well disposed to admit. His subsequent selection of a position for intrenched
encampments on both banks of the river . . . proved
him to be possessed of a good strategical eye.92
Fifth, by fortifying the northern bank sufficiently
strong to dispel thoughts of attack, Zollicoffer was buying

910R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 786.
92New York
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the additional time he needed.

Only several months into

the Civil War, the vast majority of his men, with no prior
military experience, lacked the discipline, organizaticn,
and efficiency that only time and intense training could
instill.

By creating winter quarters on the ncrthern bank,

Zollicoffer could train his men during the months ahead and
be ready by spring to make a determined move northward, if
Johnston contemplated such.
Lastly, from his exposed position, Zollicoffer could,
if the opportunity arose, strike at scattered Union columns,
something that could not be done from south of the river.
Zollieoffer's strategy waJ, at last, becoming clear in
his own mind.

By moving from Mill Springs to Beech Grove,

he presented an active threat to the Union forces in the
area, as evidenced by the skirmishes of the past weeks.
Would his next move be to send out advance guards or would
it be the entire Confederate force?

No one but Zollicoffer

was sure, not Schoepf, Thomas, Johnston, and certainly not
Crittenden.

By fortifying the northern bank and cont- 1 ,!ling

the area with artillery on the opposite shore, Zo3licoffPr
chose to remain where he was located, Beech 'rove.

This

active defense of Zollicoffer was not only the correct
to be made, but also it was justified, given the cond:
that existed.93
Rumors of Zollicoffer's advance into Kentucky continued
to spread and Schoepf received orders to move forward with

93Connelly, Army of Heartland, 90.
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four regiments to check the Southern commander.

If Schoepf

hoped to lure Zollicoffer out for a battle, he was sorely
disappointed.

Zollicoffer's command remained divided on

the banks of the Cumberland, with only five regiments at
Beech Grove, and it was highly unlikely that he would venture out of his fortifications for an engagement at less
than full strength.

Zollicoffer wrote to Bowling Green for

additional mc,n and supplies, but Johnston, confronted with
a Union advance on that city, could not spare any troops.
Zollicoffer would have to maintain his defensive stand.
The success of Zollicoffer's plan can be seen in Buell's
letter of December 17 that he was "letting him alone for
the

present..94

Meanwhile, Schoepf performed an extended

reconnaissance of the rebel intrenchments and concluded that
Zollicoffer's position could not be overrun without heavy
loss of Union life.

Beech Grove's terrain was broken and

hilly, making it difficult to place artillery in a commanding position without being exposed to Confederate batteries
on the heights across the Cumberland.

"Under these circum-

stances," Schoepf concluded, "1 hardly know what move is
best to be made."95
Zollicoffer remained in his fortified position at Beech
Grove throughout December, inducing Schoepf and others to

94
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believe that he was indeed going into winter quarters."
With the earthworks nearing completion, Zollicoffer felt
confident that the Yankees would not attack his strong
position, and, he allowed his men to protect themselves
from the winter elements by occupying the 150 lcg and mud
11ts as Christmas approached.97
January, 1862, brought with it not only a change in
military events but in the weather as well.

December had

been most unseasonable, with warm days, cool nights, and
only occasional blasts of cold air.

A Lebanon, Kentucky,

family journal listed adjectives such as warm, pleasant.
Indian summer, and moderate to describe the weather, and
recorded only four days of rainfall for the month.

But in

January the weather turned rapidly from moderate to seasonal
as wind, rain, snow, and frigid temperatures engulfed the
area.98

living quarters already erected at Beech Grove,

Zollioffer concluded to abstain from any further offensive
intentions and remain within 'ds fortifications for the
winter.

He did not expect a Federal attack during the

96Ibid., Vol LII, Pt. II, 243. Even Zollicoffer's
regimental commandersbelieved they were going into winter
quarters.
97
Ibid., Vol VII, 797; Gerald R. McMurtry, "Zollicoffer
and the- Battle of Mill Springs, "The Filson Club History
Quarterlz, 29 (Oct. 1955), 306.
98Diary of Maria I. Knott, Dec. 15, 1861 - Jan. 25,
1862, Knott Collection (Manuscripts Division, Kentucky
Library, Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, Kentucky).

45

inclement weather, and if one did occur, he considered his
chances of success greater than those of the invaders.99
With Zollicoffer's army divided on the banks of the
Cumberland and in winter quarters, Buell decided to reenforce
Schoepf with troops from Camp Dick Robinson, under the
command of Brigadier General Thomas, and attack Beech Grove.
Buell's decision to dislodge Zollicoffer was only part of
his overall plan to secure Kentucky for the Union.

However

well conceived the offensive was, it did not meet with overwhelming support in Washington, as it assigned the Cumberland Gap area a relatively unimportant role.

Lincoln pre-

ferred to control the Tennessee-Virginia railroad, which ran
south of Cumberland Gap, rather than Nashville, 200 miles
to the west.100

But he yielded to the advice of his military

advisors and the Union offensive slowly materialized.
On January 3 Crittenden arrived at Mill Springs.

Sur-

prised to find troops still at Beech Grove, Crittenden questioned Zollicoffer regarding his previous order to withdraw
across the river.

Zollicoffer explained to his superior that

the messenger had lost several days in returning to camp,
that he had expected Crittenden to arrive at any time, and
that the recent bad weather had caused a substantial rise in
the river, thus increasing the risk involved in recrossing.101

990R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 526-27.
100Abraham Lincoln to General Don Carlos Buell, January
6, 1862, Miscellaneous Papers (Special Collections, University of Kentucky, Lexington).
1° -Davis, Rise and Fall, II, 20.

46

It was apparent, however, that Crittenden disagreed with
Zollicoffer over his decision to remain at Beech Grove, as
he immediately began raft construction, and four days later
the stern-wheel steamer, Noble Ellis, arrived at Mill Springs
to aid in transporting the army back across the river.

But

the weather remained bad and the work on the rafts progressed
slowly.
Crittenden's arrival at Mill Springs heightened Union
fears of a burgeoning Confederate force, and Schoepf, in
a very detailed study of the Confederate position, vowed
it would take a force of 10,000 men to dislodge the Southerners from Beech Grove.

Zollicoffer had felled timber for

nearly a mile in front of his intrenchments so that a surprise frontal attack was impossible, while the precipitous
southern bluffs of the Cumberland rendered an infantry flanking movement impossible.102

Schoepf concluded that only

with a force of at least double that of the enemy could
the Union troops entertain any hope of carrying Beech Grove
and driving the Confederates into the Cumberland.

Such an

observation prompted Thomas to question if the Confederate
position was impregnable.

Schoepf woula not say positively

that such was the case, but he did say that an attack upon
Beech Grove would result in heavy Union losses.103
Apprehension was not confined to the Union ranks, however, as evidence of growing Confederate concern for their

1020R., SF,r. I, Vol. VII, 536.
103Ib1d., 542, 545.

47

position emerged when January entered the second week.

On

January 12, Assistant Adjutant General William Mackall replied to a transfer request made by Colonel W. S. Statham
of the 15th Mississippi Volunteers.

Statham had grown im-

patient of the defensive stand made by Zollicoffer.

Eager

for a fight, he applied for transfer to Bowling Green, an
area Statham thought, had more potential for action.

Mackall

replied,
The position of General Zollicoffer is too important
and too exposed to permit any reduction of force,
particularly so great a reduction as the removal of
your regiment would be. The General [Johnston] is
satisfied that you will soon have an opportunity
under General Zollicoffer of contributing to turn
back the invaders of the South.1
"
Johnston was correct in his assessment.
Tensions continued to grow in the Confederate ranks
regarding the rumored Union offensive when scouts reported
Federals advancing on Burkesville, to the west, in an attempt
to cut off supplies sent up river to Mill Springs.

However,

Buell issued a counterorder and Thomas turned east toward
Logan's Cross Roads where he arrived on January 17, ten miles
north of the position held by the Confederates.

Schoepf's

brigade, moving from Somerset to join Thomas, encountered
numerous delays caused by recent rains and was unable to
reach the rendezvous before hostilities commenced.
The eighteenth day of January brought with it a steady
drench of rain, increasing the possibility of floods on the

1-"Ibid.,
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Cumberland and its tributaries.

The same day, Crittenden

received advice from an area resident that two Federal
regiments had been cut off by the flooding of Fishing Creek,
to the east of Thomas.105

This was Schoepf's force, and

if Crittenden was looking for an opportunity to attack before the combination of Union armies could be achieved, the
rain seemed a blessing in disguise.

He sent the following

message to Bowling Green:
am threatened by a superior force of the enemy in
front, and finding it impossible to cross the river,
I will have to make the fight on the ground I now
occupy. If you can do so, I would ask that a diversion
be rade in my favor.'"
Late that evening, Crittenden called a council of his
subordinate officers and infored them that a Union army
of superior strength was approaching.

Their options, Crit-

tenden informed his .iubordinates, were two.

The recent

rains had divided the enemies' army, plovidng an opportunity for the Confederals to leav-

-i-c-?-1-1es and strike

Thomas' forces, an attack he would surly not be expecting.
The other alternative wam to remain within their fortifications and await the Union attack.

What followed at the

meeting has remained highly crl troversial.

Crittenden's

personal account of the conterence, made several years later,
reflected a unanimous ageement to the offensive plan.
There was ncvt one of them who did not concur with me
in that Thomas must be attacked immediately, and, if

105wrig ht, "Sketch of Zollicoffer,"
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possible, by surprise; that such an attack, if
successful in merely repulsing him, would probably give us time to cross the Cumberland with
artillery and wagons, by means of our boats, then
being built.10'
Colonel William B. Wood, however, recalled that he alone
had opposed the plan and that Zollicoffer did not vote.
Following the breakup of the meeting, Wood talked with
Zollicoffer, who expressed doubt concerning the offensive.
He "believed it to be contrary to the wishes and policy of
the commander-in-chief, General Johnston..108

J. G. M.

Ramsey, a prominent Tennessee politician, wrote to Johnston
on January 24, 1862, that Zollicoffer's advance was "against
his own earnest protest..109

Moreover, an offensive was

not in keeping with Zollicoffer's plan of an active defense.
The Tuscumbia, Alabama, Constitution reported that Zollicoffer protested against the offensive, as he thought the
Federals should be forced to attack him within his own
110
breastworks.

It is true that during December, with the

prospect of receiving men and supplies, Zollicoffer seriously

1-07Davis, Rise and Fall, I, 210. A Louisville Courier
correspondent also
that there was unanimous agreement.
Moore, ed., Rebellion Record, IV, 45.
108James Edmonds Saunders, Recollections of the Early
Settlers of North America (Baltimore, 1969), 1; Johnston,
Life of Johnston, 400. General Johnston's instructions implied a defensive campaign. Nothing in its condition warranted an aggressive move.
1090R., Ser. I, Vol. LII, Pt. II, 257.
110Moore, ed., Rebellion Record, IV, 47.
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considered an advance, but by mid-January an offensive, in
his mind, was out of the question.

He had maintained a

defensive stand at Beech Grove, with the exception of occasional forage raiding parties, since his arrival on the
northern shore of the Cumberland.

He had built winter

quarters for his men and was satisfied to remain within
his fortifications and await the Union attack.
Furthermore, Crittenden's letter of the 18th, excerpting the phase "impossible to cross the river," misrepresented the situation.
the Federals.

Crittenden saw an advantage in attacking

It would secure time for transportation of

the artillery and wagons across the Cumberland.

Thus, his

referral to the impossibility of crossing the river was
with all his military apparatus, not that he could have
crossed with only his men.

Crittenden had the services of

the Noble Ellis as well as several flatboats for the purpose of transporting men across the Cumberland, no matter
how high the water level rose.

The decision to attack

therefore, cannot be attributed in whole or in part to Zollicoffer.

It was Major General George B. Crittenden, command-

ing officer of the Confederate forces at Mill Springs and
Beech Grove, who ordered the Southerners out of their strong
defensive position to attack the Union forces at Logan's
Cross Roads.
The Confederates were awakened at midnight, January 19,
during a dreary, continuous rain to begin the march northward.

Zollicoffer's brigade of four infantry regiments, two

cavalry companies, and an artillery battery assumed the lead
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position in the march to the field of battle.

Brigadier

General William Carroll followed close behind with three
infantry regiments and a smaller battery of guns.

Held

in reserve were a regiment of infantry and two cavalry
battalions.
Streaks of lightning blazed across the clouded sky,
adding only momentary light to an otherwise dark night.
The constant rainfall further impaired the vision cf the
soldiers as they trudged along an indivisible path, listening for the sound of mud choking the shoes of troops in
front to guide them.

After six hours the Confederates had

covered only ten miles and as the gloom of dawn emerged on
this sahl-Ith morning, January 19, 1862, a crackle of gunfire
was he,
'
.

the distance; advance cavalry had met Union

picket
''kirmish lines were rapidly drawn as Zollicoffer's
tT

5

ad Ancad along the Mill Springs road, expecting resis-

tance to appcar momentarily on the
not disappointed.
valuable time.

km horizon.

They were

The soggy road had cost Luc ..outherners

They had anticipated being in position for

attack before dawn, but the.,.

arrival ro-Ighly corresponded

with early breakfast for the Union troops, who, though surprised, were awake and soon ready to give battle.
After the Union pickets were driven in, Crittenden
ordered three infantry regiments to lead the frontal attack:

111Knott

Diary, January 20, 1862. On this date, the
entry read, "Had another storm last night and considerable
thunder and rain this morning. Cloudy all day."
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the 19th Tennessee, under the command of Colonel D. H.
Cummings, the 25th Mississippi, commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel E. C. Walthall and the 20th Tennessee, led by
Colonel Joel A. Battle.

Colonel Frank Wolford's First

Kentucky Cavalry was the only Federal unit to oppose the
early Confederate advance, and it presented only nominal
resistance.

Colonel Mahlon D. Manson, commander of Thomas's

Second Brigade, sent the 10th Indiana Infantry, under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel William C. Kise, to contest
the left wing of Zollicoffer's advance along the Mill Springs
road and the 4th Kentucky Infantry, commanded by Colonel
Speed Fry to extend the Union line to the east.

Manson then

called personally on Thomas to report the une.:,
.p,-

L Con-

federate advance and his dispersion of troops.
The .irly intermittent gunfire quickened its pace as
Zollicoffer's brigade had the best of the early .tighting,
but the Confederates were unable to break through the loosely constructed Union line.

Crittenden placed Carroll's

Second Brigade immediately behind Zollicoff

s L'rontline

troops to act as reserve or to give the apoararc

of a

concentrated attack on the center with more troops than
actually engaged.

To counter, Thomas hurried forward the

2d Minnesota Infantry, under the command of Colc,, e1 Horatio
P. Van Cleve, to support the Union center.

Colonel Fry's

4th Kentucky, upon arriving at the scene of battle, had no
specific orders on placement, but Fry positioned his men
along a rail fence in the edge of a wooded area on the
extreme eastern sector of the battlefield.

Battle's 20th
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Tennessee and Walthall's 15th Mississippi were leading a
spirited advance along this flank, and, much to the chagrin
of Fry, a deep ravine penetrated the field 250 yards in front
of his position.

From its cover, the Confederates were

able to keep up a galling fire.

Having thus been thwarted

in his guest for an advantage, Fry climbed atop the rail
fence and defied the enemy to stand up and fight like men.112
For no apparent reason, Fry's futile gesture seemed to cause
a lull in the fighting.

During the lull, a most confusing

event occurred.
The morning battle was being fought without the benefit
of sunlight, as rain clouds still hovered overhead and
patches of fog passed across the battlefield.

With the add-

ed pollution of musket and artillery smoke, visibility was
poor at best.

Brigadier General Carroll commented that "the

eye could distinguish objects only a short distance."113
During this lull, Zollicoffer decided to ride over to the
position of the 15th Mississippi on his left.

At about the

same time Fry rode to his right, along the rail fence behind
which he had been fighting, to a gap between his 4th Kentucky
and the 10th Indiana, to ascertain the course of the battle.
As Fry neared the Mill Springs road, he encountered what
seemed to be an officer, riding calmly toward his lines.
The officer's uniform was concealed by a raincoat, but the
placid manner of his approach and his proximity to the Union

112Harrison, Civil War in Kentucky, 26.
1130R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 112.
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lines convinced Fry that he was a newly arrived Federal
commander sent up by Thomas.

Fry rode up to his side, so

close that their knees touched.

The unidentified officer,

nodding his head to the left, spoke first: "We must not shoot
our own men.
not.

Those are our men."

Fry responded, "Of course

I would not do so intentionally."

The conversation

ended, and Fry started back to his regiment.114
As Fry approached his men, another mounted officer
emerged from the trees where the brief meeting had just
occurred, firing his pistol into the Union ranks and striking Fry's horse.

Somewhat confused but acting on instinct,

Fry returned the fir , a. lid his men.

It suddenly dawned

on Fry that his conversat ...)n only r

s earlier was not

with a new Federal officer but wit

_placed Confederate.

As pistol and musket shots rang out
officer fled unharmed, but the (711)

ie

econd Confederate

with whom Fry had just

spoken, fell fro, his mount, k116 insLantly.

Upon view-

ing the body, there was no doubt as to the identity; it was
General Felix K. Zollicoffer.
The circumstances surrounding the death of Zollicof er
were as murky as the weather

that fateful day.

Somehow

in the confusion of battle ar:! the poor visibility, Zollicoffer rode from the protect:ion of his army into the Union
ranks.

His inability to detect Union soldiers has been

attributed to the fact that many of Crittenden's men wore
remants of blue uniforms, a common practice in the early

114Myers, Zollie Tree, 122-23.
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days of the Civil War.

When Zollicoffer rode into the ranks

of Fry's 4th Kentucky, he apparently thought it was Walthall's 15th Mississippi.

Zollicoffer's remarks to Fry

indicated that he believed the 4th Kentucky was a Confederate
unit firing on another Confederate unit.
The second unidentified officer was Zollicoffer's aide,
who belatedly realized that his general had ridden into the
proverbial lion's den and tried brashly to correct the error.
Assuming that Zollicoffer would realize his mistake and
possibly escape unharmed, he chose to fire at Fry as he rode
away, but it was Lieutenant H. R. M. Fogg who escaped, not
his commanding general.
Who killed Zollicoffer?

The most obvious answer would

be to credit Fry with delivering the fatal blow since he
was the closest to Zollicoffer arl fired the first shot in
that direction.

Indeed, many of the official accounts of

the battle as well as varying newspapers credited Fry.115
Fry, himself, avoided taking the accolades and in his official report to Thomas did not even use Zollicoffer's name,
supporting the fact that he was earlier duped by the Confederate officer as to his identity.

In an 1887 history

of Kentucky Fry supplied details concerning the death of
Zollicoffer.

In it he stated that he did fire the first

shot, but he did not know if his was the fatal one.116

115The New York Times, Cincinnati Commercial, and
Louisville Journal credit Frywith Zollicoffer's death.
1161. H. Perrin, J. H. Battle, G. C. Kniffin, Kentucky,
A History of the State (Louisville, 1888), 393.
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Nevertheless, tradition attributes Zollicoffer's death to
Regardless of who actually killed Zollicoffer, he

Fry.

died, as one chronicler out it, "under peculiar circumstances," and his loss was a staggering blow to the morale
of the Confederate troops engaged in battle, a disaster
117
from which they never Lecovered.
News of Zollicoffer's death spread like wildfire through
the Confederate ranks.

With the battle raging, Crittenden

sought to rally his stunned men and break through the Union
Walthall's and Battle's regiments charged across the

line.

field with bayonets fixed, but Fry's men stood their ground
and poured volley after volley into the Southern ranks.

The

fence Fry used earlier to issue his oratorical decree became
the only object that separated the Union and Confederate
armies.

Hand to hand combat was commonplace, as bayonets

were thrust through the rail fence and arms were wrestled
away on both sides.
Meanwhile on the left, Thomas arrived finally to direct
the Federal troops, the delay being attributed by some at
his inability to get into his new uniform.

Thomas

immediately regrouped the 10th Indiana and ordered a bayonet
charge upon the Confederates stationed by the Mill Springs
road.

Thomas then sent forward the 9th Ohio, under the com-

mand of Major Gustavus Kammerling, to support the Indiana
troops, in an attempt to neutralize the Confederate left

117Mark M. Boatner, III, The Civil War Dictionary
(New York, 1959), 319.
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and possibly turn their flank.
Fry's troops in the center.

Thomas then rode over to

Upon viewing the determined

stand made by the 4th Kentucky, he sent Van Cleve's 2d
Minnesota forward to occupy a gap between Fry and Kise.
Thomas' last maneuver was the placement of a battery of
guns and the bringing up of three additional units; the
12th Kentucky, under the command of Colonel W. A. Haskins,
and the 1st and 2nd Tennessee regiments, under the commands
of Colonels Robert Byrd and J. P. T. Carter, respectively.
The newly arrived Union troops took up a position on the
extreme eastern edge of the battlefield and applied pressure
on the Confederate right flank.

Crittenden tried to balance

the use of Federal artillery by ordering Captain A. M.
Rutledge forward with two guns along the road, but the use
of artillery by both sides proved wholly ineffective.
Momentum shifted upon Thomas' arrival, and the Yankees
started a spirited charge.

The Confederate left wing, though

reenforced by the 27th Tennessee, led by Lieutenant Colonel
T. C. H. Miller, was unable to resist the 9th Ohio's push
through the woods, and the Confederate left flank collapsed.
Panic and confusion erupted throughout the entire Confederate line, which wavered and then fell back, unable to
resist the Union troops any longer.

It was ten o'clock.

Crittenden tried to regroup his men but confusion,
disorder and chaos had engulfed the Southerners.

Haversacks

filled with corn and bacon, discarded by the panic-stricken
Confederates, were found by Union troops along the Mill
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Springs road.118

One last valiant stand was made by the

28th Tennessee, under the command of Colonel Powell, but
after he was wounded, that line collapsed as well, and the
Yankees took up pursuit of the fleeing Southerners.

Union

casualties were 39 killed and 297 wounded, whi.2.? Confederate
losses were 125 killed, 309 wounded, and 99 missing.119
The brunt of the Confederate offensive Flax

been borne by

Walthall's and Battle's regiments, which sustained 287
casualties, almost one-half of the Confederate total.
Although the Confederates actually engaged more men
than the Federals in a concentrated attack upon the Union
center, they were unable to 17..reak through the Federal ranks.
One possible reason was the untimely f.a_
but perhaps the most telling factor was the armaments of
the opposing sides.

The great majority of Southern troops

carried flintlock muskets, while others had only percussion
squirrel rifles or double-barrel shotguns.

In a continue.)

mist, these flintlocks were fired with increasing difficulty
120
or could not be fired at all.

On the other hand, Thomas'

men for the most part were equipped with Enfield, Sharp, or
Spencer rifles, more modern weapons which could carry s11 -,'

118
R. M. Kelley, "Holding Kentucky For the Union," in
Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Bud, eds., Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War (4 vols., New York, 19-56;--rirst
publishea-17-88),
119
OR., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 82, 108.
120
Young, "Zollicoffer's Oak," 166, 168; OR., Ser. I,
Vol. VII, 82, 108.
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at least a half mile.121

The superiority of arms proved

to be a decided advantage for the Union side.

Another

element which contributed to the Union victory was the fact
that Thomas commanded several Kentucky regiments, defending
their own soil, while Crittenden's forces were composed of
units from throughout the South.122
Crittenden and the remnants of his army returned to
Beech Grove late in the afternoon over the same muddy road
they had trudged only hours earlier.

Thomas followed close

behind but was unable to reach the Confederate intrenchments and organize his men for a final assault before darkness fell.

He did, however, establish a battery of artillery

and opened fire, not on the enemy within their breastworks,
but on the Noble Ellis, the small steamer used by the Confederates for transportation across the river.
Crittenden correctly sized up his situation.

"With

the morale of the army impaired by the action of the morning
and the loss of what cooked rations had been carried to
the field, I deemed an immediate crossing of the Cumberland
necessary..,123

7nder the cover of darkness, the Confeder-

ates withdrew to the southern bank in the span of six
hours, midnight to dawn.

It is well to remember that the

preceeding day Crittenden wrote Johnston explaining the

121Young "Zollicoffer's Oak," 167; McMurtury, "Zollicoffer," 312; Myers, Zollie Tree, 73.
122
Speed, Union Cause in Kentucky, 195.
123OR., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 109.
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need for battle because the river could not be crossed.
But, in fact, he accomplished the task of transporting a
defeated, demoralized force across the flooded Cumberland
at night.

Thus, it seems that the river was passable for

men, and Crittenden could have moved back to Mill Springs
whenever he wished, avoiding the resounding defeat.
As daylight neared, panic once again swept through
the remaining Confederate forces at Beech Grove.

Tents

were left standing, blankets, clothes, cooking utensils,
wagons, horses, artillery, and many of the wounded were
abandoned.

The Confederates were not even able to destroy

their papers, some of which indicated the disagreement
124
emerging from Crittenden's council of war.

Soldiers

crammed onto the already overloaded flatboats while others
:_ried to swim the flooded Cumberland.

With the first light

of January 20 emerging on the horizon, Thomas' Parrott
guns opened fire on the Noble Ellis, making its last trip
to Mill Springs, and Union infantry stormed Beech Grove.
Crittenden watched from the southern bank as the remnants
of his nine infantry regiments, four battalions and two
companies of cavalry, and portions of two artillery companies
retreated southward; the rest of his command was lost.125
Although the Yankees had achieved a brilliant victory
at Logan's Cross Roads, the most disasterous defeat the

124Pirtle Journal, January 24, 1862; Cincinnati
Commercial, January 20, 1862, quoted in Moore, ed., Rebellion Record, IV, 44; OR., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 76.
1250R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 110.
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Confederacy had yet experienced, it was nevertheless, inconclusive, since Crittenden escaped with the majority
of his force.

Thomas, when asked by Fry why he did not

demand a surrender from Crittenden the night before, re126
plied, "Hang it Fry, I never once thought of it."

Thomas

reasoned that Kentucky's sentiments regarding Union or Confederacy were still somewhat divided, and the complete
dispersion of Southern troops from Kentucky soil was the
127
best method of securing the state for the Union.
Accounts of the battle of Mill Springs of Logan's
Cross Rcads soon filled newspapers across America, with
the New York Times calling the engagement "The Most
“128
Brilliant Victory of the War.

In fact, Johnston first

learned of the disasterous defeat by reading a January 22
issue of the Louisville Courier.

These varying newspaper

accounts raised pertinent questions concerning Zollicoffer's
position at Beech Grove and Crittenden's futile attack on
Thomas.

The Louisville Daily Journal published a letter

from Colonel Green Clay, U. S. A., in which he declared
Zollicoffer's camp a strong position, whose intrenchments
could have held off 30,000 troops, and Beech Grove's winter

126Kelley, "Holding Kentucky,” I, 391.
127
Myers, Zollie Tree, 110.
128

New York Times, January 22, 1861. Accounts of
the battle from the Cincinnati Commercial, Louisville
Courier, Nashville Banner and Tuscumbia Constitution
are quoted in Moore, ed., Rebellion Record, IV, 34-49.
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129
quarters sufficient for 15,000 men.

The New York Times

reported that Beech Grove was "beautifully intrenched"
with excellent winter quarters and asked the question, "Why
130
then the attack?"

Crittenden was commanding general,

and in his opinion, an attack was not only in the best
interests of his men. but if victorious, would thrust him
into a very prominent position as well.

For his actions,

though, he became the object of sever criticism throughout
the South.
After his defeat beyond Mill Springs, Crittenden was
blasted by a torrent of scathing denunciations.

The diary

of Thomas R. R. Cobb, a prominent Georgia Congressman, contains the following entry on January 24, 1862;
We are all depressed this morning over the disaster
at Somerset last Sunday. It is attributed entirely
to a drunken, Godless General, who in a spree on
Sunday morning led our troops to their destruction.
Zollicoffer was a noble man and a fine officer. In
the effort to redeem the day, I doubt not, he lost
his life.131
Letters poured into Richmond excoriating Crittenden.
J. G. M. Ramsey wrote President Davis on January 24 describing the Confederate force as "perfectly demoralized" and
"refusing to serve under him."

Ramsey redeemed Zollicoffer

by focusing criticism on Crittenden, for "had Zollicoffer

129Louisville Daily Journal, January 23, 1862; Frankfort Tr -Weekly Yeoman, January 25, 1862.
130New York Times, January 26, 1862.
131Diary of Thomas R. R. Cobb, January 24, 1862,
Southern Historical Society Papers, XXVIII, 290. Numerous
reports circulated that Crittenden was not sober on the
day of the battle.

not been ordered to make that unwise advance all would
now have been alright [sic].

The only salvation of the

defeated army is to recall Crittenden and replace him.
.132
• • •

Landon Hayes wrote Davis declaring that Crit-

tenden's army was "utterly routed and demoralized. . .
Confidence is gone in the ranks and among the people.
must be restored.

It

I am confident it cannot be done

133
under Generals Crittenden and Carroll."

Tennessee

Governor Isham Harris chided, "Crittenden can never rally
troops [in] east Tennessee.

Some other general must be

sent there."134
In defense of his actions, Crittenden attributed the
loss of the battle to the inferiority of arms and the
untimely death of Zollicoffer, who was highly esteemed
by his men.

Crittenden reiterated the point that his

actions were out of necessity, and "I ought not be held
responsbile for that necessity.

As to how I managed it,

I have nothing further to say..135

Jefferson Davis, in

his memoirs, for apparently self-serving reasons, supported
Crittenden's explanation of the need for an attack.

He

further speculated that if all the troops had been in

132OR., Ser. I, Vol. LII, Pt. II, 256.
133Ibid., Vol. VII, 849.
.
Ibid.; Grady McWhiney, "Controversy in Kentucky:
Braxton Bragg's Campaign of 1862," Civil War History, VI
(March 1960), 7. Bragg specifically named Crittenden as
unqualified for command.
134

135Davis, Rise and Fall, II, 21.
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position at dawn, a concerted attack would have probably
resulted in victory.

He thought the strategy "not only

defensible but commendable, and the affair to be ranked
with one of the many brilliant conceptions of the war."
But Davis, seemingly unwilling to take a stand, also
refrained from chastising Zollicoffers's decision to divide
his forces along the Cumberland.

"General Zollicoffer may

have well believed that he could better resist the crossing of the Cumberland by removing to the right bank rather
than removing to the left."136
The myriad of acrimonous statements demanded action
by Richmond officials, and Confederate Secretary of War
Judah P. Benjamin inquired of Johnston his opinion on relieving Crittenden from command.

'ohnston thought this

too harsh a punishment for losing

a small battle in Ken-

tucky, 'Jut the Confederate hierarchy censured Crittenden
and kept him virtually undo:: a]H-st for a year, at which
time he resigned his commission.
Buell (-ailed the battle one of the most important
that occurre,7 during the war, the first large scale Union
137
victory.

Johnston wrote that the defeat opened east

Tennessee to Union invas-on, or, if Buell desired, an

136Ibid., 21-23. Davis stated that he was dissatisfied with the outcome but could not fault Crittenden's
motives.
137OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, 25; "Statement of Major
General Buell, May 5, 1862," in Review of the Evidence
Before the Military Commission IATic-Tiii-feJ-12y the War DepartrTITIT—(Washington, 863), 3.
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attack on Nashville.

The Federal victory did indeed open

a gap in the line of Confederate defense across Kentucky,
but Thomas did not advance.
next on Bowling Green.

He was ordered to concentrate

The Federals, satisfied with the

victory they had achieved on Logan's farm, sought to secure
other objectives, one of which was Bowling Green.

They

understood better than Crittenden the value of an active
defense.
Two questions remain to be answered.

If Zollicoffer

had lived and the Confederates had defeated Thomas' forces,
would his choice for an intrenched position at Beech Grove
have been vindicated?

Second, since the Confederate attack

failed, was it Zollicoffer's or Crittenden't defeat?

IV.

THE SKIRMISH AT MIDDLE CREEK

On November 24, 1861, Major General George B. Crittenden assumed command of what he labeled the "Eastern
District of Kentucky.

138

Crittenden's use of this

geographic terminology was only a matter of personal interpretation, but to Brigadier General Humphrey Marshall it
was a slap in the face.

With Crittenden being a superior

officer, Marshall's independent command in eastern Kentucky
was in jeopardy and as a matter of personal pride, he
tendered his resignation.
The day following his letter of resignation, Marshall
directed Colonel William Stuart, newly appointed to Marshall's
command, not to report to him at Pound Gap.

Stuart should

wait for other instructions from Crittenden at Knoxville.139
However, in early December Marshall received a letter from
his old political ally, Confederate Vice President Alexander
Stephens.

Stephens wrote that it was not the intention of

the Confederate War Department to assign Marshall's command
to Crittenden, adding that he should still report only to
General Albert S. Johnston.

Stephens knew Marshall's

1380R., Ser. I, Vol. LII, Pt. IT, 219.
139Humphrey Marshall to William Stuart, December 15, 1861,
William Dabney Stuart Papers (Virginia Military Institute,
Lexington, Virginia).
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temperamental character and had persuaded the War De140
partment not to act on his letter of resignation.
A reassured Marshall then asked that his resignation be
returned and he pledged cooperation with Crittenden, as
long as it was understood that his command was still an
independent force.

To this end, Marshall wrote Crittenden

on December 14, 1861:

"We should both understand that our

commands are separate and distinct. .

u141

As part of the Federal advance in early December, 1861,
to secure Kentucky for the Union, 3,000 troops occupied
Louisa, 45 miles north of Prestonburg.

Marshall saw the

potential threat these troops posed and decided to move his
-ce of 2,500 forward to meet them.

Union leaders re-

d reports of the Confederate advance, but once again
ited that Marshall, having been previously defeated at
.vy Mountain, would risk a major engagement with his small
fcce.142
TLe Federal commander o
Colonel James A. Garfield.

the troops at Louisa was

A native n7 (- hio, Garfield had

served in the Ohio Senate where his fluent and persuasive
speeches had propelled him into political prominence.

With

140Alexander Stephens to Humphrey Marshall, December 6,
1861, Humphrey Marshall Papers (The Filson Club).
141Humphrey Marshall to George Crittenden, December 14,
1861, Humphrey Marshall Papers (The Filson Club).
14 -Archibald Means to John Means, December 10, 12, 1861,
Means Family Papers (Special Collections, University of
Kentucky).
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the outbreak of war, Garfield enlisted, and, due to his
oratorical ability, was sent south to recruit men for
Buell's army.

His penchant for reading books on military

tactics somewhat compensated for his lack of a formal
military education, and he soon found himself in charge
of troops battling for control of the Sandy Valley.143
Continuing to move forward towards Garfield, Marshall
stopped and in late December fortified Paintsville, only
60 miles south

of the Ohio River.

Marshall reasoned that

Garfield would have to march on this small eastern Kentucky
town before moving any further south or risk having a Confederate army in hi.:3 rear which could strike central Kentucky
or even Cincinnati- 144

Garfield chose to confront Marshall,

and as December closed he moved his troops to George',
c
only ten miles north of the Confederate position.
Marshall, continuing to fortify Paintsville, grew
alarmed that he might soon have to face a Unicr army nearly
double that of his 2,500 Confederates.

Scouting reports

placed another large Union force movinq eastward from Mount
Sterling to Paintsville.

Although he wanted to achieve a

great victory in eastern Kentucky, Marshall could hardly
afford to battle a vastly superior army, and his options
were few.

He could either move out of his intrenchments and

attack Garfield before the combination occurred and then

143Warner, Generals in Grey, 166-67;
Malone, ed.,
Dictionary of American Biography, VII, 145.
1440R., Ser. I, Vol. V, 1009.
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face the other force, or withdraw to the defensive confines
of the Cumberland Mountains and wait for a better opportunity
to strike.

Garfield made Marshall's decision for him.

On January 7, the Union commander sent small detachments
of infantry forward to confront and outflank Marshall, hoping
to lure the Confederates out for a fight.

But Marshall

opted for an immediate withdrawal southward.

He needed a

better defensive position to battle the Federal troops.

If

Garfield chose to follow the Confederates, rather than wait
for the junction of Union troops, Marshall thought that he
could possibly catch Garfield in an ambush.
Garfield did not wait for the additional men.

Instead

he pressed his troops southward through Paintsville to the
He suspected Marshall had intrenched

mouth of Abbott Creek.

another mile up this small stream.

Therefore, the Union

army crossed over to Middle Creek to attack Marshall from
the flank and rear, while Union cavalry attacked the Confederate front.

However, as Garfield's forces crept up the

narrow and winding road by Middle Creek, gunfire came from
the mountains above.

Marshall's men were not across Abbott

Creek, but had fortified a position in the ridges above
Middle Creek.

145

Marshall had set a deadly trap for Gar-

field, but the Confederates were overly anxious to spring
it and premature gunfire disclosed the ambush.
withdrew immediately and regrouped his men.
o'clock in the morning.

145Ibid., Vol. VII, 30.

Garfield

It was ten
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Middle Creek was a narrow yet rapid mountain stream.
Recent rains had caused a substantial rise in its elevation
and made the surrounding terrain a quagmire.146

The only

passable road in the area was the one which Garfield's
troops used to advance.

It was rocky, only ten feet wide

with abrupt edges, one falling off into the creek, the other
cutting into the steep and rocky mountainside.147
By noon, intense gunfire had engulfed the field.

Marshall

fired on the Union forces from two guns positioned in a
gorge of the left fork of the creek, supported by two dismounted cavalry companies.

This battery commanded the road

up which the Federals had advanced.

Across the creek, nestled

in a hillside ridge, was the 5th Kentucky Infantry, commanded
by Colonel John Williams, and the 29th Virginia Infantry,
led by Colonel A. C. Moore.

Directly above them, on another

ridge which formed an acute angle, was the 54th Virginia Infantry, under the command of Colonel Robert Trigg, and two
cavalry companies.

Another

battery of two guns located on

this ridge was also able to sweep the entire field.
Garfield positioned his men on a long ridge opposite
Middle Creek.

To ascertain the location and strength of

Marshall's men, Garfield ordered a cavalry charge.148

But

the Federals were quickly driven off by the artillery and

146Crowe-Carraco,
The Big Sandy, 39; OR., Ser. I,
Vol. VII, 47.
147

Balch, Life of Garfield, 157.

148OR., Ser. I, Vol.
VII, 30-31.
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fought the rest of the day on foot.

14::th the Confederates

intrenched on different ridges and firing at will, Garfield
sent several infantry regiments across the road and up the
steep ascent to establish better position.

But the numerous

trees and rocks afforded the Confederates excellent defensive cover and Marshall's men poured several volleys into
the Union ranks, forcing them to retreat.
As more Union troops were brought up and the firing
increased, Marshall deployed a piece of his reserve artillery to fire on Garfield's exposed right flank.

Although

only one piece, it caused Garfield to send 120 men across
the creek to silence it.

But Marshall withdrew the gun

before the Federals could seize it, and the Union troops
were forced to seek shelter from Confederate volleys.
In the late afternoon Garfield sent another cavalry
charge up the road to draw the fire of the 5th Kentucky and
29th Virginia.

At generally the same time, he sent 400

men around the base of the hills to the left, hoping to
encircle the Confederate position.

But darkness fell before

the move was completed, with its success or failure remaining in coubt.
Before nightfall, Marshall observed a movement of men
to the north.

Their starred and striped banner revealed

that they were the earlier anticipated Union reinforcements
for Garfield coming from Mount Sterling.

Not knowing their

strength, Marshall decided not to risk another engagement
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and he withdrew to Piketon that night)
-49
not

Garfield did

pursue Marshall, for his troops were fatigued, hungry

and suffered from exposure.

He returned to Prestonburg

to await supplies and further reinforcements before fol.
150
lowing.
Both Union and Confederate forces suffered few casualties in the skirmish at Middle Creek.

Official reports

indicate that the Confederates lost 11 killed and 15
wounded in the fight, while Union casualties were 2 killed
and 25 wounded.151
decisive.

The outcome of the skirmish was in-

The entire fight had been a standoff, with

both sides retreating at day's end, yet each claiming
victory.

The result was perhaps summed up best by a Bath

County resident:

"The South claims victory, the North

admits no defeats.n152
Marshall had good defensive position in the ridges
of the mountain, with a crossfire of artillery and infantry on the road below.

The relative lack of Union

casualties was once again due to the inferiority of
arms with which the Confederates were equipped.

Garfield

149Balch, Life of Garfield, 166.
150
Ibid., 167; Archibald Means to John Means, January
14, 1862, Means Family Papers (Special Collections, University of Kentucky). This letter contains an excellent
description of Middle Creek and the dispersion of troops.
151

Ser. I, Vol. VII, 29, 31, 56.

152J.
and Sallie Arnold to Lee McGinnis, January 25,
1862, Miscellaneous Papers (Special Collections, University
of Kentucky).
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knew that if he could hold Marshall in check, the additional men coming from Mount Sterling would give him a
greater number of troops, and an increased chance of
success.

During the fighting, therefore, he attempted

no major offensive moves, unwilling to senselessly risk
losing men against an intrenched foe.

A Union soldier

in Garfield's army, Archibald Means, wrote that the
Federals were extremely lucky to have escaped Marshall's
deadly trap.153
After a three day march southward, covering only 16
miles, the Confederates arrived at Martin's Mill on Beaver
Creek.

The Mill was the nearest point where Marshall's

weary soldiers could obtain badly needed provisions.

As

they continued to retreat, Marshall tried to present a
promising outlook to Richmond officials.

He asked for

additional men to increase his infantry to 5,000 and cavalry
to 1,500 for the purpose of driving to Lexington.

His

request was denied, and he was ordered to fall back to
Pound Gap and await further instructions.154

His lack of

effectiveness in eastern Kentucky obviously had tempered
the support he once had in the War Department.
By February, 1862, Garfield was once again ready to
take the offensive against Marshall's forces encamped at
Pound Gap.

But a six inch snowfall fell, covering the

153Archibald Means to John Means, January 24, 1862,
Means Family Papers (Special Collections, University of
Kentucky).
154 OR.

Ser. I, Vol. VII, 57.
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already almost impassable roads and causing Garfield to halt
at Piketon.

The minute provisions found in the Sandy Valley

during winter could not sustain an army of any size, and the
inclement weather only made the situation worse.

The cir-

cumstances were so bad at Pound Gap that Marshall's men had
already exhausted their bread supply and had little else to
eat.155

Moreover, they were not equipned with adequate

clothing for the winter, sucn as gloves, blankets, or overcoats.

They had, instead, received cotton clothing from the

Confederate commissary in western Virginia.

In a stirring

speech to his men, Marshall said the cotton pants were woven
out of the finest quality "Southern wool," witY
Kentuckians were obviously not acquainte

'*ch many
fatelv

Marshall said "the lie stuck in my throat" while he spo.
to his troops.157
By early March,

a break in the winter storms a1lowe71

Garfield to ready his men for the move.

Pound Gap was

irregular opening in the Cumberland Mountains, 45 miles
southeast of Piketon.

Major J. B. Thompson, the Confederate

commander at this mountain pass, had erected a large breast158
work across the narrow road leading through the gap.
Upon viewing the Confederate defenses, Garfield decided to

155Ibid., 898.
156Edward 0. Guerrant, "Marshall and Garfield in Eastern
Kentucky," in Johnson and Buel, eds. Battles and Leaders, I, 394.
157
Humphrey Marshall to Alexander Stephens, February
22, 1862, Humphrey Marshall Papers (The Filson Club).
15813a1ch, Life of Garfield, 173.
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send a c=_valry force of 200 up the road as a demonstration,
while 600 infantry crept along a steep mountainside path,
on the right of the Confederates.
Marshall's scouts reported the Union advance on March
15,

adding that they were still a good day's march from

the Confederate position.

Another snow fell on the morning

of the March 16, inducing the Confederates to believe that
the Federal attack would be postponed.

But at nine o'clock

in the morning, Garfield ordered 1.1s cavalry to attack up
the road.

The snow did not hinder the cavalry, but it did

slow the infantry who were travelling over treacherous
ground.

They were not in position for the combined attack

before the Union cavalry drew fire.

After a brief but

intense skirmish, the Confederates forced the Union -_:avalry
to fall back.

The action in front, however, had succeeded

in diverting the Southerners' attention away from their
right flank, and the Federal infantry moved within firing
range before being detected.

Thompson removed his front

line troops from behind the breastwork to meet the advancing Yankees.

After several volleys, the Confederate

line broke and the whole force fled into the ravines and
undergrowth of the mountains behind them into western
Virginia.

The entire action took less than an hour.

Gar-

field lost no men in the rout, while the Confederates lost
7 killed and wounded.159

1590R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. I , 33.
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Marshall's forces had suffered another humiliating
defeat in eastern Kentucky at Pound Gap.

Several months

earlier Marshall's appointment to command an army in
eastern Kentucky had been greeted with wild enthusiasm.
But the Confederate commander had not led his troops to
victory.

Marshall commented that the loss of Pound Gap

was not as important to the overall Confederate strategy
in eastern Kentcuky as he had earlier thought.
Pound Gap indefensible

He considered

and the entire area unfit for an

army: no shelter from the winter elements, no food, no
forage, and most of all, no sympathy for the Southern
cause.160

But he longed for another invasion of eastern

Kentucky.

160Ibid., 35.

V.

A NEW COMMANDER AND RENEWED HOPE
FOR A CONFEDERATE KENTUCKY

By the end of March, 1862, both Confederate armies
in eastern Kentucky had been forced to withdraw from the
state.

Crittenden's troops had marched into northeastern

Tennessee, and Marshall's men had retreated into southwestern Virginia.

The submission of Forts Henry and

Donaldson in western Kentucky and the evacuation of Bowling
Green in southcentral Kentucky left Union forces in complete
control of the state.

Johnston's Confederate line of de-

fense across southern Kentucky had collapsed.
The debacle on Logan's farm was a staggering blow to
the Confederacy.

Jefferson Davis even contemplated break-

ing up the Army of Eastern Tennessee for morale purposes.
Instead, he decided to leave the unit intact, but to replace Crittenden.

On March 8, 3862, Major General Edmund

Kirby Smith received orders to proceed to Knoxville and
assume command of the Confederate troops there.161

A T':est

Point graduate, Smith had served with distinction in the
Mexican war, earning two brevets.

Resigning his commission

in March, 1861, he served as General J. E. Johnson's Chief

161
0R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. 11, 303.
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of Staff and was also a brigade commander at First Bull
Run.162
Smith's arrival in east Tennessee could not have come
at a more crucial time.

Union Generals Thomas and Schoepf,

after combining their armies, were threatening Cumberland
Gap.

Buell was also moving southward into middle Tennessee

with his main army.

By the end of March, Thomas and Schoepf

had reached Cumberland Ford.

They sent Colonel Samuel P.

Carter forward with skirmishers to drive in the Confederate
pickets.
ers.

Union artillery also opened fire on the Southern-

Colonel James Rains, Confederate commander at Cumber-

land Gap, vowed to "resist to the last," and with his intrenched rifleman and artillery batteries, returned the fire.
The fight for Cumberland Gap began.163
From his headquarters in Abington, Virginia, in March,
Humphrey Marshall wrote General Robert E. Lee and Confederate
President Jefferson Davis concerning the possibility of
another advance into Kentucky.

Both men agreed that a

successful advance would bring about very desirable results,
but added that Marshall would have to recruit his own men.
None could be spared from Virginia.164

Marshall began im-

plementing his plan by issuing a call for militia from the
counties of western Virginia.

Several weeks of recruiting,

162
Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography, X,
424; Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, 769-70.
163OR., Ser.
I, Vol. X, Pt. II, 357.
1641bid., 321-22.
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however, enlisted only 500 men, far short of the number he
needed to combat Garfield.

Combining the new recruits with

Marshall's entire command, the Army of Eastern Kentucky
numbered less than 2,000 men.
Garfield was still in the Sandy Valley, keeping a
watchful eye on Marshall.

In March, however, he received

orders to move his army to Bardstown where it would become
the Seventh Division of the Army of the Oh, commanded by
Brigadier General George W. Morgan.165

Garfield and Morgan

would then combine with the other Federal forces at Cumberland Ford, with Morgan being the ranking Union officer, and
overrun the Confederates at Cumberland Gap.
With the arrival of the additional Union forces in
April, a large scale attack on Cumberland Gap appeared
imminent.

However, Morgan delayed in advancing his troops

when he viewed Cumberland Gap.

He called the Confederate

defenses "the strongest position I have ever seen except
Gilbratr [sic]."166
all troops we'attack.

Only after he was absolutely sure

In place, would he implement his plan of

By assaulting the front and left flank of the Gap,

encircling Rains' position, Morgan hoped to force a Confederate retreat.
General Kirby Smith realized the gravity of the situation.

Not only did the Federals outnumber his forces almost

two to one, but also he believed that Rains could not hold his

165Ibid., 360.
166 Ibid.,

157.
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position against a Union flanking movement.
additional men.

Smith needed

His best hope for reinforcements lay in

the Confederate army under Humphrey Marshall in western
Virginia.

But on May 3, Smith received a telegram from

Marstlall saying his effective force was less than 1,000
men, whose condition was "deplorable."

Smith could not,

herelore, expect any help from Marshall.167
Not only did Marshall balk at joining Smith's command,
but his preoccupation with an independent army dictated
his own maneuvers.

Less than a week after his telegram

to Smith, Marshall marched his "deplorable" men northward
from Abington to meet an advancing Union column in western
Virginia,

'he Federals were led by Brigadier General Jacob

D. Cox, who was sent to seize the Lynchburg-Knoxville railroad.

The opposing forces met at Princeton, Virginia, on

May 13.

In a small but intense skirmish, the Confederates

forced a Unic

retreat at day's end, the first clear cut

victory for Marshal1.168
Smith's Army of East Tennessee consisted of less than
7,000 men, as compared to 11,000 Federals with Morgan.169
Under these circumstances, Smith's options were few.

He

could stand and fight against overwhelming odds and risk
being cut off, or he could withdraw and hope that additional

167Ibid., 77.
169
Ibid., Vol. XII, Pt. 3, 200; Leeiand Hathaway Diary
Leeland Hathaway Recollections (The Southern Historical
Collection, University of North Carolina), 58.
169
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men and equipment would arrive to check the Federal advance.
On May 29, Archibald Means, in Garfield's army stationed
at Cumberland Ford, reported that none of the Confederate
tents could be seen atop Cumberland Gap.

He continued, "We

have pickets in a high mountain who could see the enemy's
tents and camp up till last night.

But today neither men

or [sic ]tents can be seen."17°
Morgan had been cautious in his advance on Cumberland
Gap.

Although it seemed the Southerners had retreated,

Morgan reasoned that it could be a ploy to draw the Federals
into another ambush, the tactic that had become so popular
in the eastern Kentucky mountains.
days before advancing.

He waited for several

On June 13, when a dense cloud of

smoke rose above Cumberland Gap, Morgan suspected that
Smith had burned new timber for a smoke screen to prevent
any rapid Union movement to overtake the fleeing Confederates.

After delaying two days, Morgan readied his men for

the attack, and they charged up the steep sides of Cumberland Gap to whatever fate awaited them.
When the Federals reached the outskirts of the Confederate defenses, they found no opposition.

The Confed-

erates had begun their retreat several days earlier and the
last of their force escaped only hours before the Union
assault troops scaled the mountainside.

Morgan later

boasted that "after two weeks of maneuvering, we have

170
Archibald Means to John Means, May 29, 1862, Means
Family Papers (Special Collections, University of Kentucky).
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taken the American Gilbrator [sic] without the loss of a
171
single life."
As Smith fell back to Knoxville, he learned that Humphrey Marshall had submitted his resignation once again.
tirn

172
it was accepted.

This

On June 19, 1862, Marshall an-

nounced to his troops that circumstances beyond his control
173
compelled the resignation.
The circumstances surrounding Marshall's second resignation undoubtedly stemmed from the same reasons as his
first--his obsessions with an independent army and an
invasion of Kentucky.

With Smith falling back to Knoxville

and in desperate need of additional men, Marshall realized
that his army would probably be sent to join Smith.

Mar-

shall's independent army and plans for another invasion
would be lost.

This Marshall could not accept, and he sub-

mitted his resignation.
Marshall had expected to be the dominate Confederate
leader in eastern Kentucky.

Following his retreat into

Virginia, however, Marshall's small independent army simply
did not figure prominently in Confederate strategy.

Mar-

shall was, in the eyes of many Richmond officials, an obese,
egotistical politician, whose value lay in securing eastern
Kentucky for the Confederacy at the outbreak of war.

In

1710R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, 556.
172Ibid., Vol. X, Pt. II, 604.
173Humphrey Marshall Proclamation, June 19, 1862,
Humphrey Marshall Papers (The Filson Club).
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that he had failed.

By the summer of 1862, Marshall's

lengthy letters requesting additional men and equipment
had grown intolerable.

His resignation was gladly accepted.

By the end of June, Morgan had not advanced any farther
south than Cumberland Gap.

Smith requested and received sev-

eral additional infantry regiments to bolster his force to
174
15,000 men.

But Buell's army was moving slowly across

middle Tenness towards Chattanooga and Smith needed still
more men to check Buell's advance, regain the initiative, and
retake Cumberland Gap.

The army Smith needed was in Tupelo,

Mississippi, under the command of General Braxton Bragg.

On

July 24, Smith asked for Bragg's cooperation in a "brilliant
er campaign."

Smith added, "I will not only co-operate

-ou, but will cheerfully place my command under you,
jet to your order.'175

After consulting with Davis,

scon moved his army to Chattanooga.
Smith's ultimate

1 was an invasion of Kentucky.

Jefferscr Davis supportej. Smith's plan and suggested that
to produce the "greatest effect" on the people of Kentucky
another Confederate force should move westward from Virginia.
e asked, "Where is Marshall?

Now is the time for him to

go in..176

174

OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt.IT, 715.

175Ibid., 734.
176Douglas Southall Freeman, ed., Lee's Dispatches:
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Marshall had resigned on June 19 when he thought his
independent army and plans for an invasion were lost.
However, when Davis informed Marshall of Smith's plan for
an offensive, Marshall applied for and received reinstatement on June 23.177 The only stipulat.ion with the reassignment was that Marshall's army would be subject to Smith's
orders when they combined in Xentucky.

Marshall accepted

the command and by the end of July was ready for another
chance to control eastern Kentucky.
Bragg arrived at Chattanooga on July 30, and met with
Smith the following day.

After the meeting, Bragg said

they agreed to "measures for mutual support and effective
cooperation."

Within two weeks the (;ffensive began.

The

plan called for Smith to move on Cumberland C;ap and force
a Union retreat, then combine with Bragg to cut off Buell
in middle Tennessee.178
Whether or not Smith ever intended to
Bragg has been an object of controversy.

ooperate with

On August i, as

he advanced on Cumberland Gap, Smith wrote Bragg that Morgan had at least one month's provisions, which would be
much longer than they had anticipated for retaking the Gap.
Smith suggested, therefore, that he bypass Cumberland
Gap and continue his march towards Lexington.

177William

Morgan

Preston Johnston to wife, July 22, 1862,
Johnston Family Papers (The Filson Club).
1780R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt.
II, 741.
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would then be forced to retreat.17 -9

Bragg approved of the

plan, adding that he favored a move on Lexington rather
than Nashville, as had been previously discussed.

However,

it would be at least two weeks before his army would be
supplied for the move northward.

Bragg also suggested

that Marshall should move immediately to join Smith.180
By the second week of August, Smith was at Cumberland
Ford, with Marshall moving toward Piketon.

However, the

freedom Marshall had enjoyed in maneuvering his men in
eastern Kentucky no longer existed.

Smith ordered Marshall

to halt at Piketon, giving him responsibility in the early
days of the offensive to intercept Morgan's retreat from
Cumberland Gap.

Smith's goal was Lexington.

By the end of August, Smith neared the heart of the
bluegrass region.

Marshall was again in eastern Kentucky,

and Bragg was moving northward from Chattanooga.
Confederate invasion of Kentucky had begun.

179Ibid., 748.
180Ibid.,
•
749.

The

VI.

ANALvSIS

With the outbreak of civil war in April, 1861, Kentucky occupied the precarious position of a neutral in
the conflict.

For the next five months Kentucky eschewed

the appeals to join the fighting.

But by September, move-

ments by Confederate and Union armies forced a divided state
to take to arms.
Secessionists in eastern Kentucky were hopeful that
the armies of Humphrey Marshall and Felix Zollicoffer would
control the area.

But the counties of eastern Kentucky

were largely Unionist in sentiment and offered little support for the South.

From the opening skirmishes at West

Liberty, Barboursville, and Ivy Mountain the Confederates
were stopped in their advance.

Following the defeats at

Logan's Cross Roads and Middle Creek, the Confederate armies
were forced to vacate eastern Kentucky.
Logan's Cross Roads was the major battle between Union
and Confederate armies in eastern Kentucky during 1861-62.
Zollicoffer's occupation of Mill Springs and his subsequent
choice for an intrenched position across the Cumberland
at Beech Grove were justified.

In light of Schoepf's view

that Beech Grove was an excellent defensive position, a
valid question is why did Crittenden abandon Zollicoffer's
defensive strategy?
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The answer seems to lie in Crittenden's desire to
develop his own strategy.

Since Zollicoffer had already

intrenched at Beech Grove, if Crittenden chose to remain
there, it would only be a continuation of Zollicoffer's
plan--not Crittenden's plan.

This was important to Critten-

den, who felt that he should immediately be in control of
the situation.

By ordering a withdrawal to Mill Springs,

he countered Zoilicoffer's previous actions.

He would then

proceed with a strategy of his own.
The overriding factor in Crittenden's need for a confrontation with Thomas was the extra time an attack would
secure for transporti

his men, supplies, and equipment

across the Cumbelanu

riceivable that Crit-

tenden was uncertain as to w

Ictually be done.

Although the weather was seaFJ

ald have also hamp-

ered any operations Thomas wouli kw.,

iltured.

At no

time during early January, 1862, were the Union troops
any closer to the Confederate army than ten miles, that
being the distance from Beech Grove to Logan's Cross :- ),f7ads.
Since Crittenden was able to transport his men across the
Cumberland in six hours after thc htle, it is, therefore,
conceivable that his entire army
river.

By moving his suppL

Cumberland in late afternoon,

CO6i

have crossed the

..ind equipment across the
men at night, the entire

Confederate army probably could have withdrawn to Mill
Springs before Thomas arrived at Beech Grove.

The Union

army would have to travel over roads that the recent rains

90
had made a quagmire.

Only a slow movement could have been

made, if they would have attempted it at all.
If the Confederates had won the battle at Logan's Cross
Roads, Zollicoffer's decision for a stand at Beech Grove
probably would have been vindicated by historians.

A prin-

cipal reason for his move across the river was his hope
that he could strike a scattered column of Union troops.
In light of his desire for a stand in winter quarters, his
nearly impregnable position at Beech Grove, his active
defensive plans, and specifically Crittenden's tenuous
excuse for the need of battle, the responsibility for the
defeat falls to Major General George B. Crittenden.
Confederates in extree eastern Kentucky were under
the guidance of Humphrey :
,larshall.

Marshall, also deeply

involved in Confederate politics, threatened resignation
when affairs conflicted with his plans.

His obsession with

an independent command no doubt created numerous headaches
in Richmond.

Marshall considered himself to be the leader

of a Confederate eastern Kentucky, and he envisioned his
army marching into Lexington, Frankfort, and Louisville.
Always the politician, Marshall would not only use his
advance to enhance his wartime reputation, but also to garner support for future elections in Kentucky.
From the beginning his command was a farce.

Weighing

over 300 pounds, Marshall proved incapable of a rigorous
field campaign in the eastern Kentucky mountains.

He did

not win a single victory in Kentucky, and when his army
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retreated into western Virginia in 1862, eastern Kentucky
was cleared of Confederate

forces.

Marshall hoped to play a large role in Bragg's invasion of Kentucky.

However, when Smith ordered him to

stop at Piketon to cut off Morgan's retreat, Marshall did
not comply.

Reasoning that Smith had no authority to

issue orders since a combination of armies had not yet
occurred, Marshall continued his march towards Lexington.
When Morgan did indeed retreat from Cumberland Gap, Marshall
did not intercept the Union army, which escaped north of
the Ohio River.
It would have been very difficult to put together a
trio of Confederate commanders less likely to cooperate
then Bragg, Smith, and Marshall.

A major characteristic

they shared was their unwillingness to serve under anyone
else.

To deliver Kentucky to the Confederacy, a concerted

movement on their part was crucial, yet each went his own
separate way, following self-serving plans, dooming the
invasion.
reward.

The banner of personal glory was their ultimate

The failure of the Confederate invasion of 1862

forced Bragg, Smith, and Marshall to withdraw from Kentucky
and, with the exception of a few minor skirmishes and raids
into the state, left Unionists in firm control of Kentucky
for the duration of the Civil War.
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(Special Collections, University of Kentucky).
Published personal accounts of events related to
tnis study included:

Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected

Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953),
8 vols.; Statement of Major General Buell, May 5, 1863, In
Review of the Evidence Before the Military Commisson A22ointed by the War Department (Washington, D.C. 1863);
Basil W. Duke, Reminiscences of General Basil W. Duke (Garde
City, New York, 1911); Douglas Southall Freeman, ed., Lee'
Dispatches:

Unpublished Letters of General Robert E. Leo

to Jefferson Davis and the War Department of the Confederate
States of America, 1862-1865 (New York, 1957); and James E.
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Saunders, Recollections of the Early Settlers of North
America (Baltimore, 1969).
Two unpublished theses were also helpful.

Mai Flournoy

Van Deren, "Humphrey Marshall" (master's thesis, Louisiana
State University, 1936), covered Marshall's entire life.
Though somewhat outdated, it did give insight into
Marshall's political career before the Civil War, which
substantially influenced his activities during the war.
Also of use was Gary A. Donaldson, "Kirby Smith in Kentucky:
The Invasion of 1862" (master's thesis, Western Kentucky
University, 1977).

This source detailed Smith's role in

the Confederate invasion of Kentucky, with a good understanding of his character as well.
A valuable source for this study was the New York
Times.

As one of the most influential

newspapers in the

United States, it was well documented with the occurrences
in Kentucky from neutrality to the end of the war.

The

editorials typified Unionist hopes for eastern Kentucky.
The fact that the Times often reprinted stories found in
regional newspapers made it especially helpful.

Columns

most frequently reprinted were the Tuscumbia, Alabama
Constitution, Louisville Democrat, Louisville Journal,
Frankfort Commonwealth, Winchester, Kentucky, National
Union and Cincinnati Commercial.

Other newspaper accounts

were found in Frank Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record:

A

Diary of American Events (New York, 1861-68), 12 vols.
Columns from the Nashville Banner, Louisville Courier, Tuscumbia Constitution, and Cincinnati Commercial were found
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in this source.

The New York Tribune and Woodford, Kentucky

Pennant were also documented from other sources.

Kentucky

newspapers which countered one another and were most helpful in this project were the pro-Southern Frankfort TriWeekly Yeoman and the pro-Union Louisville Daily Journal.
As it might be expected with contemporary newspapers, they
were filled with inaccuracies.
Several government documents were cited in this study,
the largest being the Official Records.

But the Congressional

Globe and House and Senate Journals were excellent sources
for governmental reaction to events in Kentucky.
Other contemporary accounts of events related to this
study were found in the Southern Historical Society Papers
(Richmond, Virginia, 1914-1959), 52 vols.; Moore, ed., The
Rebellion Record; Robert Johnson and Clarence Buel, ed.,
Battles =,
.nd Leaders of the Civil War (New York, 1884-88),
4 vols.; and J. Stoddard Johnston, Kentucky, in Clement A.
Evens, ed., Confederate Military, History (New York, 1962;
first published Atlanta, 1889), 13 vols.

Though not always

unbiased, these accounts on the whole contained useful
information.
Several general reference sources were extremely
helpful for biographical information.

Most prominent amona

these was Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography (New York, 1926-36), 20 vols., which contained brief
but excellent individual sketches.

For information on the

generals who served in the war, Ezra Warner, Generals in
Grey (Baton Rouge, 1959), and Generals in Blue (Baton Rouge,
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1964), are excellent works.

For the many tedious details

of the Civil War, Mark M. Boatner, III, The Civil War Dictionary (New York, 1959), proved an indespensible guide.
Several biographical and autobiographical studies
discuss events from the perspective of their subjects and
the author.

William R. Balch, The Life of James Abram

Garfield (Philadelphia, 1881), and William Preston Johnston,
The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston (New York, 1879),
were both heplful, yet biased accounts.

Also of help for

a personal insight into the workings of the Confederate
government was Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the
Confederate Government (New York, 1958; first published
1881), 2 vols.
James E. Copeland, "Where Were the Kentucky Unionists
and Secessionists?"

The Register of the Kentucky Historical

Society, 71 (Oct. 1973), 344-65, surveyed the distribution
of sentiment across the state in 1861.

A more detailed

study of Kentucky's neutrality was Wilson P. Shortridge,
"Kentucky Neutrality in 1861," The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, IX (March 1923), 283-301.

An outdated

but still useful view of this subject was Benjamin F.
Stevenson,

Kentucky Neutrality in 1861 (Cincinnati, [ n.d.l),

which was a paper read before the Ohio Cummandry of the Military
Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, June 2, 1886.
Governor's Magoffin's role in the conflict was detailed
in several studies.

Among these, Lowell H. Harrison,

"Governor Magoffin and the Secession Crisis," Register, 72
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(April 1974), 91-110, was the best source for this work.
Another, more biased look at Magoffin was Michael T. Dues,
9Governor Beriah Magoffin of Kentucky:

Sincere Neutral or

Secret Secessionist?" The Filson Club History Club Quarterly, 40 (Jan. 1966), 22-28.

Dues concluded that Magoffin

was a sincere neutral despite all the evidence to the contrary.
The skirmish at Ivy Mountain was recounted in two
Henry P. Scalf, "The Battle of Ivy

worthwhile articles.

Mountain," Register, 56 (Jan. 1958), 11-26, was a scholarly,
well written account.

Also of use was W. T. Lafferty,

"Civil Was Reminiscences of John Aker Lafferty," Register,
59 (Jan. 1961), 1-18, a very good personal narrative of the
skirmish.
Concerning the battle of Logan's Cross Roads, a good
overall study wasLowell H. Harrison, "Mill Springs, The
Brilliant Victory," Civil War Times Illustrated, X (Jan.
1972), 4-9, 44-47.

Also helpful was Gerald R. McMurtry,

"Zollicoffer and the Battle of Mill Springs," The Filson
Club Quarterly, 29 (Oct. 1955), 303-319.

Although a brief

sketch, it provided some very detailed information of the
fight.

A followup study of this article was Cassius M.

Clay, "Postscript to the Battle of Mill Springs," The
Filson Club Quarterly, 30 (April 1956), 103-114.

An

interesting, impressionistic look at Zollicoffer's death
was MinnieHite Moody, "The Man Who Shot General Zollicoffer,"
The Georgia Review, 19 (Fall 1965), 299-308.

However, the
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best single description of the battle besides Myers'
work was R. M. Kelley, "Holding Kentucky For the Union,"
in Battles and Leaders, I, 373-392.
Thomas L. Connally, Army of the Heartland; The Army
of Tennessee, 1961-62 (Baton Rouge, 1967), was the best
source on the role of Tennesseans in eastern Kentucky.

Another

work of lesser value was Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee (Norman, Oklahoma, 1952).

Bragg's role in the Con-

federate invasion of Kentucky was discussed in Grady
McWhiney, "Controversy in Kentucky:

Braxton Bragg's

Campaign of 1862," Civil War History, VI (March 1960),
5-42.
Sources specifically dealing with eastern Kentucky
for this period were rare.

But information was obtained

from henry P. Scalf, Historic Floyd (Prestonburg, Kentucky,
Carol Crowe-Carraco, The Big Sandy (Lexington, 1979),
alsc .' considerable use.

The most beneficial source

was, however, Edward O. Guerrant, "Marshall and Garfield
in Eastern Kentucky," in Battles and Leaders, I, 393-397,
which detailed the struggles of Marshall and Garfield in
the eastern Kentucky mountains.
Comprehensive works on the Civil War period of Kentucky
were also few.

The best military study was Lowell

9arrison, The Civil War in Kentucky (Lexington, 1975).

Phi; work complements E. Merton Coulter, The Civil War and
Reconstruction in Kentucky (Chapel Hill, 1926), which is a
social, economic and political sutdy of the war in Kentucky.
Also of help was Thomas Speed, The Union Cause in Kentucky,
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1860-65 (New York, 1907), though definately biased.
Balance this with William Preston Johnston, The Life of
General Albert Sidney Johnston.

For information related

to the struggle of Kentucky as a border state in the war,
Edward Conrad Smith, The Borderland in the Civil War (New
York, 1927), proved helpful.
General histories of Kentucky which contained useful
information for this study were:

W. H. Perrin, J. H. Battle,

G. C. Kniffin, Kentucky, A History of the State (Louisville,
1888); Lewis and Richard Collins, History of Kentucky
(Covington, 1874), 2 vols.; and Thomas D. Clark, A History
of Kentucky (Lexington, 1960).

